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THE INTERNET AT 20: EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTION
FOR CYBERSPACE

Henry H. Perritt, Jr.*

INTRODUCTION
In 1995, this Journal published my1 article arguing for broader public access to
government-generated information, explaining that the Internet provided the
potential for a new window into government operations and decisions.2 That article,
summarized more thoroughly in Part I.C below, focused on only one aspect of the
then-neophyte Internet’s capacity to revolutionize how people interact with each
other, participate in democratic political systems, conduct commerce, and create and
communicate art.3
The Internet is now about twenty years old—measured from the time that the
federal government decided to release it from its governmental sponsorship and
control in the research and national-security communities and launch it into the
private sector as a global information infrastructure. Some of the earliest battles over
the Internet were fought over access to government information. Gradually, the
battlefield broadened, encompassing a wide range of federal and state constitutional
issues, federal common law, and private international law.
The same core issues and principles explored in my 1995 article
however—deferring to competitive markets and encouraging them to produce a
diversity of products and services, ensuring access to the marketplace by all consumers and producers, and providing a mechanism to compensate for injury4—now
frame the full range of legal and policy questions arising from the Internet’s ubiquity.
The combination of technological characteristics defining the Internet, regulatory philosophies first articulated by the Clinton Administration, statutes addressing
* Professor of Law and former Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Member of the bar:
Virginia (inactive); Pennsylvania (inactive); District of Columbia, Maryland, Illinois,
Supreme Court of the United States. SB in Aeronautics and Astronautics, MIT, 1966, SM
in Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, 1970, J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1975.
1
To date, the author has never written an article in the first person. My involvement in
the development of the Internet, however, warrants use of the first person in this Article.
2
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Sources of Rights to Access Public Information, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 179 (1995).
3
See id.
4
Id. at 183–90, 211.
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particular problems, judicial decisions, and market-driven commercial practices
form the Internet’s “constitution.” As with the British Constitution, no overarching
constitutional document exists; rather,
[S]afeguards of human rights and freedoms are not the rigid
legalism and paper guarantees of written constitutions and Bills
of Rights but the benevolent exercise of discretion by public
officials, who are accountable through their political masters to
the legislature and the people, accompanied by the efficiency
and careful scrutiny of the legislative process.5
Further,
[T]here is no single, identifiable document that is widely accepted as a systematic statement of the basic tenets of British
constitutional law.
But this is not the only possible definition of a “constitution.” . . . [A] constitution [is] “the whole system of government
of a country, the collection of rules which establish and regulate
or govern the government.”6
The same can be said about the Internet’s constitution. It is not expressed in a
single document. Instead, it comprises the open architecture inherent in the
Internet’s technological protocols together with a collection of government policies,
legislative enactments, and judicial decisions that seek to protect the basic architectural philosophy, ensure space for entrepreneurial freedom, and guard against the
abuse of economic or political power.
This Article looks back over the Internet’s first twenty years, highlighting the
crucial legal decisions by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches that have
led to the Internet’s success, and which now frame its constitution. I participated in
many of these decisions and wrote more than a dozen law review articles and reports
suggesting directions for public policy and law. This Article uses this foundation to
consider the future, focusing on major legal controversies, the resolution of which
will define the Internet’s third decade—either strengthening or undermining its
constitution.
5

Anthony Lester, Fundamental Rights in the United Kingdom: The Law and the British
Constitution, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 337, 340–41 (1976) (describing the engines of the British
Constitution).
6
Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 329, 332 (2002) (footnote omitted).
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I. DEVELOPING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
During the 1990s and early 2000s, policy makers and entrepreneurs developed
a “constitution” for the Internet that succeeded in balancing a number of overlapping
and conflicting objectives:
•
•
•
•

•

ensuring open access to the physical infrastructure;7
ensuring that intermediaries flourished and that content originators had
free access to them;
developing the tools for expansive e-commerce;
developing rules for transborder jurisdiction so that the burden of
enforcement did not cause intermediaries to shut out controversial
content; and
managing security, intelligence, and law-enforcement goals so that
people were not afraid to use the Internet.8

Intertwined with these objectives was the need for a system to manage Internet
domain names and addresses that would be broadly acceptable around the world.
A. Foundations
Work on developing legal regimes to govern the Internet began in earnest in the
mid-1990s, about the time my article was published in this Journal. By then, the
basic technological and policy foundation for the Internet was reasonably secure.9
Conferences had been held at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government
in 1990, and elsewhere, on unleashing the Internet from its academic and federally
subsidized origins.10 In 1994, the National Research Council published a report on
the potential of what would become the Internet to support communications and
information exchange activities throughout society.11 By 1995, the federal govern-

7

The infrastructure access issue initially focused on opening up the Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN), and later on assuring Net Neutrality by a handful of Internet
backbone service providers and content intermediaries.
8
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
9
See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., REALIZING THE INFORMATION
FUTURE: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND (1994).
10
See generally Barry M. Leiner, et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY
(2003), available at http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/internet-51/history-internet/brief
-history-internet.
11
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 9.
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ment had defunded the Internet, and handed its further development to private
entities using the growing array of private networks with growing bandwidth.12
The 1990 Harvard conference addressed technological, economic, and broad
public policy issues presented by the evolution of the Internet into the private
sector.13 I was one of the few participants who focused on legal issues. My article,
Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic Networks,14
refined some of the legal ideas I had first addressed in a paper presented at the
conference. Observing that the unbundling of value at the heart of the Internet’s
architecture would result in a greater diversity of products and services, narrowly
focused on particular functions, and able to interconnect seamlessly with functions
performed by products and services offered by others, the article articulated three
goals for the legal framework for the Internet:
1. It should promote a “diversity of information products and services in
a competitive marketplace; [t]his means that suppliers must have reasonable autonomy in designing their products.”15
2. It should protect “users and organizers of information content” from
being “foreclosed from access to markets or audiences;”16 and
3. It must provide compensation for injury suffered from information
content when victims can prove traditional levels of fault, while shielding intermediaries from liability for content posted by others.17
A small group of lawyers met monthly in Washington for a couple of years after
the Harvard Conference: David Johnson, Ron Plesser, Jerry Berman, Robert
Gellman, former Chief Counsel to the House Committee on Government Operations,18 Kent Stuckey, General Counsel of Compuserve, and me.19 We developed
ongoing relationships and conversations with other critical policy developers: Becky

12

See Leiner, supra note 10.
See KAHIN: BUILDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (Brian Kahin ed., 1992) (edited
versions of papers presented at the conference).
14
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to
Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65 (1992).
15
Id. at 71.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the United States:
Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183 (2003).
19
Hereinafter the “Washington Group.”
13
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Burr,20 Mitch Kapor,21 Larry Lessig,22 and Ron Staudt.23 Together, we helped
crystallize principles that guided the broadening public discourse over the Internet.
Meanwhile, Congress was beginning to glimpse the potential. The High-Performance Computing Act of 1991,24 recognized the potential for society to benefit from
“rapid adoption of open network standards,”25 and “of an information infrastructure
of data bases, services, access mechanisms, and research facilities available for use
through the [Internet].”26 It authorized the establishment of a National Research and
Education Network,27 with the capability of handling data at 1 gigabit per second,
developed “by purchasing standard commercial transmission and network services
from [private] vendors,”28 and lead to the “establishment of privately operated highspeed commercial networks.”29
When the Clinton Administration took office in January, 1993, it became clear
to those interested in wide-area computer networking that dial-up electronic bulletin
boards, e-mail, and perhaps the Internet were on the threshold of revolutionizing
public access to governmental information.30 Vice President Gore had emerged
20

J. Beckwith Burr, WILMER HALE, http://www.wilmerhale.com/becky_burr/ (last visited
Feb. 9, 2012). J. Beckwith (“Becky”) Burr, then an attorney-advisor at the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), and later a senior Internet policy adviser at the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), worked with Magaziner to
develop the Clinton Administration’s policy for the Internet and e-commerce. Id. She was
the Washington Group’s main liaison with the Magaziner effort. Id.
21
Biography: Mitchell Kapor, KAPOR.COM, http://www.kapor.com/bio/index.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2012). Mitch Kapor was the developer of Lotus 1-2-3, the first commercially
useful spreadsheet application. Id. He participated in the Harvard Conference and several
subsequent panel discussions on Internet policy organized by the Washington Group.
22
Larry Lessig, Short Biography, LESSIG BLOG, http://www.lessig.org/info/bio (last
visited Jan. 19, 2012). Larry Lessig, then a junior faculty member at the University of
Chicago Law School, initially joined our efforts as a participant in conferences addressing
Internet jurisdiction and governance. Id. He went on to become one of the most prominent
and thoughtful public intellectuals addressing Internet issues, especially copyright law’s
potential to do harm.
23
Faculty Biographies: Ronald W. Staudt, IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, http://
www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/rstaudt/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). Ron Staudt was a professor of
law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and a pioneer in harnessing information technology to
make legal institutions more effective. Id. As a board member of the National Center for
Automated Information Research (NCAIR), he encouraged NCAIR to fund several
conferences organized by the Washington Group.
24
Pub. L. No. 102-194, 105 Stat. 1594 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501–5543
(1998)).
25
15 U.S.C. § 5502(4) (1998).
26
Id. § 5502(1)(c).
27
15 U.S.C. § 5512(a) (1998).
28
Id. § 5512(c)(8).
29
Id. § 5512(c)(4).
30
See John Podesta, Podesta Details Clinton Administration’s Open-Government
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while he was still in the Senate as an evangelist for the “Information Superhighway.”31 Technological visionaries were beginning to talk about the possibility of a
broader “electronic commerce” revolution. Ron Plesser, a member of the Washington Group, recruited me to join the telecommunications section of the Clinton
Transition Team.32 Although the nominal focus of the section was on the FCC, Ron
and I pushed for language in our transition report addressing broader issues of
networking.
It was not yet clear, however, what the administration’s philosophy should be
regarding the regulatory environment for the emerging technologies. The same
issues of access, intermediary liability, security for e-commerce, and standardization
existed whether proprietary networks like Compuserve and America Online dominated the future or whether they were marginalized by the Internet’s open architecture.
The Office of Management and Budget and the General Services Administration
commissioned me to write a “white paper” on some of the issues, focused on the
ground rules for accessing government information, such as judicial decisions,
statutes, and agency rules and regulations in electronic form.33 The issues were
easier here because they did not confront private property ownership in the purely
private sphere. Indeed, a federal statute—the Freedom of Information
Act34—already guaranteed access to information in paper formats. The question was
how it should be extended to electronic formats. I had already done some of the
early work on how to resolve this question.35
Achievements, FREEDOM FORUM, available at http://www.freedomforum.org/packages/first
/foi/podesta.htm.
31
See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S12,734 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1991) (statement of Senator
Gore) (referring to “information superhighway,” on passage of S. 272, High-Performance
Computing Act).
32
See D. Ian Cooper, Critics Blast Report Supporting Carnivore, ABC NEWS (Nov. 22,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/Story?id=119286&page=1=.TXCcaRXOFBS
#.TxtNDG8V2HN.
33
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., PUBLIC INFORMATION IN THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE, REPORT TO THE REGULATORY INFORMATION SERVICE CENTER, GENERAL
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, AND TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION
AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (1994).
34
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).
35
See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Christopher J. Lhulier, Information Access Rights
Based on International Human Rights Law, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 899 (1997); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., The Information Highway: On Ramps, Checkpoints, and Tollbooths, 13 GOV’T INFO. Q.
143 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Should Local Governments Sell Local Spatial Databases
Through State Monopolies?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 449 (1995); Perritt, supra note 2; Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Determining the Content and Identifying Suppliers of Public Information in
Electronic Form, 17 GOV’T PUB. REV. 325 (1990); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Federal Electronic
Information Policy, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 201 (1990); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic
Acquisition and Release of Federal Agency Information: Analysis of Recommendations
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My article previously published in this Journal framed the problem and possible
solutions:36 “The article mobilize[d] the legal arguments entitling members of the
public, including publishers, to access and emphasize[d] the clash of interests when
a government,” tempted by new revenue possibilities, “seeks to sponsor a monopoly
for access to information in electronic formats.”37 It analyzed the federal Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) and its state counterparts, which are intended to increase
public access,38 and copyright law, which gives the “owner” of information the
power to prevent access or use.39 It considered how the First Amendment may come
into play by limiting information monopolies, whether supported by copyright law
or just imposed as a matter of public policy and economic interest of those already
possessing the information.40 It evaluated antitrust41 and burdens on interstate
commerce42 limitations on information monopolies.
During the same period, I authored ACUS Recommendation 88-10,43 which
encouraged agencies to apply the FOIA to electronic formats and recommended
greater use of information technology to disseminate agency information, and
discouraged exclusive arrangements for disseminating public information. It supported agency experimentation with electronic means of providing public participation and rule-making, adjudication, and other administrative proceedings.44 Subsequently, I drafted a set of principles for access to federal information in electronic
formats eventually adopted by the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates
in August 1991,45 which shaped amendments to the Freedom of Information Act,46
and worked with Ron Plesser as he mediated an agreement among stakeholders on
what became the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.47 Among other things, the

Adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 253
(1989).
36
Perritt, supra note 2 at 179.
37
Id. at 179.
38
Id. at 186–95.
39
Id. at 197–204.
40
Id. at 205–10.
41
Id. at 211–14.
42
Id. at 214–17.
43
Recommendation of the Administrative Conference Regarding Federal Agency Use
of Computers in Acquiring and Releasing Information, 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-10 (1989)
[hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 88-10].
44
Id.
45
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Freedom of Information, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 391,
398 n.61 (1998) (summarizing ABA recommendations).
46
Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, 110 Stat. 3048, 3050 §
5 (1996) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)); see also Perritt, supra note 45, at 395–98
(analyzing EFOIA).
47
Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2002));
see Perritt, supra note 45, at 407–08 (analyzing Paperwork Reduction Act).
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Paperwork Reduction Act prohibited agencies from “establish[ing] an exclusive,
restricted, or other distribution arrangement[s],”48 and assured private entrepreneurs
of access to public information so that they could develop their own value-added
products.
While I was working on the “white paper,”49 Ira Magaziner, in the White House
Office, aided by Becky Burr at the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, undertook the task of developing a broader policy statement.50
Magaziner’s effort took longer than mine because it involved a much broader
spectrum of interests. It produced two documents: a “Green Paper” on Internet
domain names,51 and a “Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,”52 both of
which had seminal and continuing influence. The Framework was analogous to the
Federalist Papers in articulating constitutional principles for the Internet. It committed the United States government to “widespread competition and increased consumer choice” as the defining features of the new digital marketplace, “a nonregulatory, market-oriented approach to electronic commerce,” and discouraged
“taxes and duties, restrictions on the type of information transmitted, control over
standards development, licensing requirements and rate regulation of service providers,” likely to throttle the Internet in its adolescence.53
From the earliest discussions about moving the Internet from the governmentfunded research and education communities to the private marketplace, it was
apparent that new issues related to freedom of expression, access rights, and liability
of intermediaries would arise.54
B. Creative Commons Philosophy55
48

44 U.S.C. § 3506(d)(4)(A) (2002).
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50
See infra notes 51 and 52.
51
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741 (June 10, 1998)
(summarizing process for developing “Green Paper”). The Green Paper is considered further
infra in Part II.E.1.
52
See The White House, Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (July 1, 1997),
available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html.
53
Id.
54
See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Symposium, Introduction, The Congress, the Courts and
Computer Based Communications Networks: Answering Questions about Access and
Content Control, Symposium, 38 VILL. L. REV. 319 (1993) (surveying and synthesizing
symposium articles on freedom of expression, intermediary liability, and access guarantees
in Internet-like networks); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network
Communities, 38 VILL. L. REV. 349 (1993) (evaluating different legal models for assuring
access to Internet resources); Perritt, supra note 14 (identifying principal legal issues likely
to shape the evolution of the Internet).
55
The term “creative commons” came into use later, and is generally applied to
applications software and content. The term, however, embraces the foundational philosophy
49
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These early principles developed for access to government information and for
regulation of the Internet drew upon and reinforced the Internet’s unique technological architecture. The Internet is fundamentally different from the Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN) and from broadcast radio and television networks.56 It
is indifferent to the type of traffic contained in the packets that move across it. The
originating computer takes a full-motion video, an e-mail message, the text of an
article, or a Facebook posting, and breaks it up into packets and sends them into the
Internet.57 Once they get into the Internet, they look like any other packets to all the
routers. The receiving computer reassembles them into a full-motion video, a
message, an article or a new Facebook item. This indifference to traffic content
reflects the Internet’s four architectural principles.
1. The Internet is layered; different functions are assigned to different layers.
This reflects the approach “OSI stack,” which ensures that each layer can pass
messages to adjacent layers through a standardized, open architecture prescribing
the formats for such interlayer communication.58 The Internet itself, under this
layering principle, is concerned only with passing standardized packets—Internet
Packets (IP) from one edge to another. The communications lines and
switches—called “routers”—in the middle of the Internet “cloud”59 are indifferent
to the content of the IP packets that traverse the cloud. This layering or building
block approach means that designers of any one layer can make whatever engineering judgments they wish without needing to concern themselves about the capacity
of adjacent layers to handle their traffic.60 That permits specialized innovation and
affords a more competitive market structure than if innovation at any one layer had
to wait until all the other layers involved could be adapted.
2. The Internet employs an “end-to-end design principle,”61 closely related to the
layering principle. Applications such as email processing, compression and decompression of files representing voice or video, reassembly of message components
into messages in the proper order—take place in applications beyond the edge of the
network rather than inside the cloud. This contrasts sharply with the design principle
of the Internet.
56
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for Movies, 10 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 106, 215 (2010).
57
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., What is the Internet?, INTERNET JURISDICTION, http://www
.kentlaw.edu/cyberlaw/resources/what’s.html.
58
Perritt, supra note 56, at 214–15.
59
“The Internet is frequently represented in network diagrams as a cloud, signifying that
users communicating through the Internet do not need to be concerned what is inside the
cloud.” Perritt, Jr, supra note 56, at 214 n. 467.
60
Id.
61
See Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163,
1164–65 n. 2 (1999).
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of the traditional circuit switched PSTN where most of the intelligence is in the core
of the network and the devices beyond the edges of the network are relatively
“stupid.”62 The end-to-end principle enhances competition because it leaves it to
users and providers operating beyond the edge of the network to decide what
applications they want to use or to innovate.
3. “The Internet protocol separates the underlying networks from the services
that ride on top of them. IP was designed to be an open standard, so that anyone
could use it to create applications and new networks.”63 Thus, the Internet can be
implemented on almost any kind of underlying communications channel, including
dial up telephone circuits, dedicated telephone trunk circuits, optical fiber modulation and multiplexing protocols, microwave or high frequency radio. The underlying
communications technologies affect the bandwidth of Internet connectivity obtainable over those protocols, but otherwise the users of the Internet do not need to be
concerned about how the bits are actually transmitted and received through wires,
optical fibers, or space.
4. The overarching rationale, a result of honoring the first three, is that no
central gatekeeper should exert control over the Internet. This governing principle
allows for vibrant user activity and creativity to occur at the network edges. In such
an environment, entrepreneurs with new ideas for applications need not worry about
getting permission for their inventions to reach end users. Closed networks like
cable video systems provide a sharp contrast. There, network owners control what
consumers can see and do.64
C. Ensuring Access
The need to ensure the integration of all of the Internet’s separate parts was
apparent early in the Internet’s emergence.65 To do this, anyone who wanted to
contribute to the communications and information infrastructure represented by the
Internet must have access. Common carrier regulation was the traditional means for
the law to guarantee access to communications and transportation infrastructures,
but common carrier regulation was not consistent with decentralization and privatization.66
62

Perritt, supra note 56, at 215.
Reconsidering Our Communications Laws: Ensuring Competition and Innovation:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2d Sess. 116 (2006) (statement
of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.).
64
Id. at 2–3.
65
See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure,
30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51 (1995) (analyzing traditional legal mechanisms for assuring
access to communications infrastructures and recommending a minimalist approach for law,
focused on interfaces).
66
See id. at 67.
63
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1. 1996 Telecommunications Act
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 moved public policy fundamentally away
from a centralized regulated monopoly approach toward a competitive one more
reliant on market forces.67 Central to its philosophy was ensuring access to the
infrastructure. The Act was premised on the now-quaint vision that the future would
be dominated by video entertainment transmitted by telephone companies, and
telecommunications service provided by cable companies.68 The word “Internet”
appears only four times in the statute,69 outside special provisions dealing with
protecting children from harmful information on the Internet. At the same time,
however, it fundamentally altered the industry structure by opening up competition
in the PSTN.70 It also instructed the FCC to take action to provide incentives to
deploy advanced broadband technologies.71 Pitched battles ensued before the
Commission and in the courts over how competition should be assured under the
Act.72
The 1996 legislation expresses a preference for facilities-based competition.73
A facilities-based competitor has its own physical infrastructure.74 But to achieve a
completely facilities-based market structure, new entrants would have to overcome
enormous economic and legal barriers to entry. They would have to build their own
local loops, dig up the streets to bury their wires or optical fiber, put up their own
poles to carry above-ground wire and fiber, and deploy their own switching centers.

67

See Nicholas Economides, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Its Impact, 11
JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 455, 456–57 (1999).
68
“Telephone company entry into the delivery of video services will encourage telephone
companies to modernize their communications infrastructure. Specifically, the deployment
of broadband networks would be accelerated if telephone companies were permitted to offer
video programming. These networks would be capable of transmitting voice, data, and video
to consumers.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-204(i) at *53 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
16–17.
69
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
70
See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (1999) (requiring interconnection and unbundling of network
elements); id. § 259 (requiring established providers to share infrastructure with new
entrants); id. § 271 (blocking Bell operating companies from entering the long distance
market until they ensured competition in their local exchange markets).
71
See 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2008); see also Ad Hoc Telecomm. Users Comm. v. FCC, 572
F.3d 903, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (characterizing Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
§ 1302).
72
See generally HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW sec. 7 (rev. ed.
2010) (analyzing details of FCC decisions and court decisions under the 1996 Act).
73
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-204(I) § 242(a)(3) (explaining the need for the resale obligation
to permit emergence of facilities-based competition).
74
Id.
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The core legal strategy embedded in the 1996 Act was to use its interconnection,
unbundling, and resale obligations as a way of giving new entrants a foothold until
they could build out their own physical infrastructure.75 Incentives for incumbents
also were important. If incumbents could receive revenue for sharing their existing
facilities with new entrants, they might have less incentive to deploy new technologies that would reduce costs and open up revenue opportunities from new product
lines. The FCC dealt with this possible adverse incentive by basing allowable
charges for new entrants on forward-looking, rather than historical, costs.76 The
incumbent could not recover costs based on the cost of its embedded technologies,
but on the costs of the most efficient technology in the marketplace—costs that were
falling rapidly.77 That reduced total revenue achievable by maintaining existing
assets and provided an incentive to the incumbent to upgrade.78
Three years after the enactment of the 1996 Act, some of the key controversies
reached the Supreme Court in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.79 The Court
approved most aspects of the FCC’s approach, while directing that the Commission
give more attention to the criteria for unbundling and sharing specific network
elements.80
2. “Digital Tornado”
Shortly after enactment of the 1996 Act, on March 27, 1997, the FCC released
a staff paper, entitled Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications
Policy, and authored by Kevin Werbach, analyzing the FCC policy alternatives for
the Internet.81 A central theme running through the paper was that the FCC, and
other government agencies, should seek to limit regulation of Internet services.82 In
framing his approach, Werbach stated:
75

See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
76
Id.; 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (2012).
77
See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (2012).
78
See Time Warner Cable, 15 FCC Rcd. 1124, 1134 (Jan. 5, 2000) (explaining that
incumbent cable television providers are not entitled to access open video systems in their
market area “in order to preserve the incentive of such cable operators to upgrade and
maintain their franchised systems and to promote facilities-based competition. If such an
operator were permitted to become a programming provider on an open video system serving
its franchise areas, it would have less incentive to invest in its own facilities and strengthen
its position as a facilities-based competitor in these areas.” (footnote omitted)).
79
525 U.S. 366 (1999).
80
Id. at 387–92.
81
Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy (FCC
Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 29, 1997), available at http://www.fcc.gov
/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp29.pdf.html.
82
Id.
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Because it is not tied to traditional models or regulatory environments, the Internet holds the potential to dramatically change the
communications landscape. The Internet creates new forms of
competition, valuable services for end users, and benefits to the
economy. Government policy approaches toward the Internet
should therefore start from two basic principles: avoid unnecessary regulation, and question the applicability of traditional
rules.83
3. Making the “Pipe” Bigger
Once the basic decision was made to privatize and commercialize the Internet,
and once the PSTN was opened up, key technological developments increased the
momentum through the 1990s and 2000s. The first barrier to fall allowed access
speeds to increase.84 When the Internet was unleashed in the early 1990s, access was
possible through dedicated lines leased from the telephone company or through dialup modems connected to ordinary voice telephone lines.85 By the early 1990s,
penetration of cable television infrastructure, the development of cable modems, and
the modification of cable networks to handle traffic in both directions, revolutionized bandwidth available at the edges of the network.
Somewhat later, new technologies deployed by the telephone companies,
principally Digital Subscriber Lines (DSLs), allowed data rates on retail telephone
lines to increase commensurately.86 By the end of the twentieth century, major
telephone service providers, having mainly crushed the threat of competitive local
exchange carriers (CLECs),87 committed substantial capital to improve their net83

Id. at ii.
Use of the word “speed” is potentially misleading. All electronic signals move more
or less at the speed of light—186,000 miles per second. The rate at which data can be
handled, however, depends on bandwidth. An ordinary telephone voice circuit provides about
4 KHz of bandwidth, limiting data rates to 56 Kbps with advanced modulation techniques.
See MARGARET LEVINE YOUNG, INTERNET: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE 10 (2d ed. 2002).
“Speed,” as used in this text, refers to the speed of data transmission.
85
Typical bandwidth was 1.4 to 1.5 Mbps on a leased T1 line or 56 Kbps through a dialup modem. Id. at 13.
86
DSL, developed at Bellcore in the mid 1980s, demonstrated the feasibility of inserting
broadband digital signals on the wires designed for baseband analog voice signals. See
Gareth Marples, The History of DSL Internet Access—A Race for Technological Speed,
THEHISTORYOF.NET (Sept. 11, 2008), http://thehistoryof.net/history-of-dsl.html.
87
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed competitive local exchange carriers to
compete with incumbent local exchange carriers by allowing CLECs to use their
infrastructure. CLEC, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/CLEC.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2012).
84
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works88 by deploying optical fiber beyond central offices,89 often directly to residences and commercial premises, and marketing DSL service to all of their customers.
One of the impediments to widespread use of the Internet was the need to know
the domain name (URL) of a desired destination. Search engines evolved as a kind
of automated index to URLs. One of the most successful early search engines was
AltaVista, developed by Digital Equipment Corporation and introduced in 1995.90
By the beginning of 1999, Google began to emerge as a search engine with a better
search algorithm,91 and by the mid-2000s it dominated the search engine industry.92
Compression algorithms facilitated distribution of music and videos. Internet
distribution of music exploded with the development of the MP3 compression
algorithm and associated hardware and software known as codecs.93 The introduction of mpeg-4 in 1998 similarly facilitated Internet distribution of full-motion video
files.94
Load sharing was widespread by 2000, enhancing the capacity of popular web
sites.95 As e-commerce exploded, the traffic to popular web sites was more than a

88

Widespread availability of DSL required telephone companies to remove loading coils
from the part of the network that connected central offices to residential and commercial
customers. Loading coils extend the reach of voice signals by reducing the capacitance of
longer lines. See Land Coils, DSLREPORTS.COM (Jan. 2, 2004), http://www.dslreports.com
/faq/6371. Capacitance is an undesirable feature of a communications channel because it
smooths out the oscillations in an analog signal. See id. Loading coils, however, also block
higher frequency signals, making DSL data transmission impossible.
89
Widespread deployment of an optical fiber infrastructure has made it possible for the
Internet to accommodate exploding demand for higher bandwidth. Signals transmitted over
optical fiber experience much less attenuation and interference than the same signals
transmitted over copper (or other metallic) wire. An optical fiber offers orders of magnitude,
higher bandwidths, and longer link distances than copper wire.
90
AltaVista: A Brief History of the AltaVista Search Engine, WEBSEARCHWORKSHOP,
http://www.websearchworkshop.co.uk/altavista_history.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
91
Google History, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/corporate/company/history
.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
92
Google: A Brief History of the Google Search Engine, WEBSEARCHWORKSHOP, http://
www.websearchworkshop.co.uk/google_history.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
93
Mary Bellis, The History of MP3, ABOUT.COM (2012), http://inventors.about.com/od
/mstartinventions/a/MPThree.htm.
94
Both standards involve patented technology that is licensed by MPEG LA, LLC.
MPEGLA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2012); see id.
95
Load balancing was a feature of Microsoft Windows NT, introduced in 1993. A History
of Windows, MICROSOFT.COM, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/history (last
visited Feb. 11, 2012). Cisco introduced a more sophisticated load-balancing product in
1996, promoted as a replacement for the Domain Name Service (DNS) round robin strategy.
Load Balancing 1, CISCO SYSTEMS,(1998), http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/cxsr
/400/tech/lobal_wp.pdf.
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single server could handle.96 A protocol was needed that could share the burden
among multiple servers controlled by the same entity and providing essentially the
same information.97 The result was “load sharing,” which “balance[s] the load across
a bunch of physical servers, . . . mak[ing] those servers look like one great big server
to the outside world.”98
Wireless data communications at speeds similar to those employed in wired
computer networks have permitted the Internet to expand beyond the infrastructure
defined by physical wires.99 One can access the Internet now—at least in areas of
fairly dense population—from anywhere.
Development and deployment of wireless data systems that could handle data
at speeds useful to computer networks awaited assignment of higher-frequency radio
spectrum and hardware that could operate at those higher frequencies.100 In 1985,
the FCC first authorized the use of unlicensed101 spread spectrum102 transmitters in
96

KJ (Ken) Salchow, Jr., Load Balancing 101: The Evolution to Application Delivery
Controllers 1 (2007), available at http://www.f5.com/ppc/downloads/load-balancing101
-evolution-adc.pdf.
97
Id.
98
Id. Early efforts involved having a DNS serving the URL of the service provide
different IP addresses in rotation, as queries were received. Id. at 1–2. Later developments
involved having a cluster of servers listen to one IP address through a border router, which
then redirected queries to various servers behind the firewall with locally assigned IP
addresses. Id. at 3. Later, “application delivery controllers” were developed, which resided
outside application servers. They presented virtual server addresses to the outside world and
then forwarded connections to the most appropriate real server. Id. at 4.
99
See, YOUNG, supra note 84, at 15.
100
Theoretical principles of radio engineering dictate that the bandwidth of a signal
increases as the data rate being transmitted increases. The higher bandwidth necessary for
higher data rates could not be accommodated at lower frequencies which were already
crowded with broadcast radio and television, military and public safety, and other
commercial communications.
101
Before that, every transmitter required a station license.
102
The FCC explained spread spectrum modulation: “Spread spectrum communication
systems use special modulation techniques that spread the energy of the signal being
transmitted over a very wide bandwidth. The information to be conveyed is modulated onto
a carrier by some conventional techniques, usually a digital modulation technique, and the
bandwidth of the signal is deliberately widened by means of a spreading function. The
spreading technique used in the transmitter is duplicated in the receiver to enable detection
and decoding of the signal. Spread spectrum systems offer two important technological
advantages over conventional transmission schemes. First, the spreading reduces the power
density of the signal at any given frequency within the transmitted bandwidth, thereby
reducing the probability of causing interference to other signals occupying the same
spectrum. Second, the signal processing in spread spectrum systems tends to suppress
undesired signals, thereby enabling such systems to tolerate strong interfering signals.”
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE
UNLICENSED DEVICES AND EXPERIMENTAL LICENSES WORKING GROUP 8 n.13 (2002),
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the 902–928 MHZ, 2400–2483.5 MHZ and 5725–5850 MHZ bands.103 The result
was the explosion of wireless local area networks (LANs) under protocols popularly
known as Wi-Fi.104
Third generation (3G) and fourth generation (4G) wireless technologies, generally associated with smart phones, enable high-bandwidth wireless connections for
a variety of portable devices, including smartphones, tablets such as the iPad, and
netbook and laptop computers.105 These technologies became commercially available in 2001106 and 2010, respectively.107 Expanding broadband wireless access was
an important goal of the congressionally mandated National Broadband Plan,108
published by the FCC in 2010.109
The ubiquity of high-bandwidth wireless data connections means that one can
be connected to the Internet all the time. Constant connectivity has two major
implications. First, it dramatically increases demand for Internet-accessible products
and services. Audiences can listen to music almost constantly, watch movies or
other video entertainment at odd moments of leisure while they wait for appointments or ride the bus or train, and order books or other consumer products impulsively, as soon as they hear favorable reports from a friend or on the radio or
television. This phenomenon means that industry structures built around segmentation of delivery channels—such as movie theatres, television, and DVDs in the
video entertainment industry—must now recalibrate their business models to
accommodate a marketplace where the old product categories are irrelevant.
Second, ease of use becomes even more important when one is browsing the
Internet, checking out friends on Facebook, playing a song, watching a movie, or
ordering merchandise on a small handheld device instead of a desktop or laptop
computer. This means that consumers will gravitate to one-stop, integrated services
such as Amazon or Facebook—instead of going to the trouble of checking out
different web sites. This is likely to intensify the preference for cyberspace “empires,” considered in Part II.A.

available at http://transition.fcc.gov/sptf/files/E&UWGFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter FCC
UNLICENSED DEVICES REPORT].
103
Id. at 8.
104
Id. at 6.
105
3G and 4G Wireless, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/topic/3g-4g-wireless (last visited Jan.
20, 2012).
106
See Danielle Dunne, What is ‘3G’ Technology?, CNN.COM (Oct. 22, 2001), http://
europe.cnn.com/2001/TECH/industry/10/22/3g.defined.idg/index.html.
107
Kristena Hansen, 4G Wireless Technology: A Look at What’s Ahead, LA TIMES.COM
(June 13, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/13/business/la-fi-4g-20100614.
108
47 U.S.C. § 1305 (2005) (authorizing the establishment of a national broadband service
development and expansion program).
109
FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN (2010), available at
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.
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4. Convergence of Cable Modem and Telephone Regulation
The FCC gradually merged aspects of cable and telephone regulation as it
applied to the Internet, initially deregulating DSL, and more recently recognizing
that some regulation may be necessary to assure net neutrality, as considered in Part
II.B.
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,110
the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s determination that broadband Internet service
provided by cable companies does not constitute a “telecommunications service”
under Title II of the Communications Act.111 Accordingly, such service is not
subject to mandatory common carrier regulation. Shortly after deregulating cable
modem service, the FCC announced a decision to treat broadband Internet access
provided by Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) like cable modem
Internet access,112 placing telephone company offerings of broadband service outside
all the traditional telephone company regulatory requirements—common-carriage,
unbundling, resale, tariffing, price regulation, and inter-carrier compensation.113
Robust competition for Internet access services is emerging and will accelerate,
the Commission concluded, encompassing not only the present market leaders, cable
modem service and DSL service, but increasingly satellite-based and fixed broadband wireless,114 and access through the electricity grid.
D. Domain Name Regulation
Domain name administration is central to regulation of the Internet.115 One can
have an Internet presence such as a web site only if one has a domain name.116
110

545 U.S. 967 (2005).
Id. at 996–97.
112
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities
et al., 20 FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005).
113
Exemption of the broadband pipe provided by the telephone companies does not,
however, mean that the services they provide that run through the pipe are exempt. Consider
the FCC’s treatment of voice over IP Providers (VoIP). See id. at ¶ 54, 14964.
114
Id. at ¶ 59, 14885.
115
The system for assigning domain names and for managing the top levels of the
hierarchical DNS are described in RFC 1591. Jon Postel Domain Name System Structure and
Delegation, Request for Comments: 1591 (Mar. 1994). Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc
/rfc1591.txt.
116
That is not strictly true. Internet packets are routed based on numerical IP addresses.
One could theoretically maintain an Internet presence with an IP address and without a
domain name, but users seeking the holder of the IP address would have to know the
numerical address. Moreover, assignment of IP addresses is integrated with assignment of
domain names. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741, 31742
111
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Refusal to register a domain name or revocation of an existing domain name
excludes the applicant or holder from the Internet. Accordingly, whoever regulates
domain names has fundamental regulatory control over the Internet.
Certain characteristics of the Internet make regulation of addresses and domain
names necessary. The Internet’s common name and address space means that each
domain name and numerical Internet address must be unique. Otherwise, routers
could not route packets unambiguously to the correct destination.
Soon after taking office, the Clinton administration undertook to decide how
domain name regulation should work in a decentralized, privatized Internet.117 The
process continued until well into the President’s second term, and resulted in the
“Green Paper,”118 which announced that the United States government would
recognize a new non-profit corporation that would take over administration of the
domain name system.119 The result was the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers, or “ICANN.”120
ICANN adopted the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution policy,121
imposing on all registrants of domain names an obligation to submit to private
dispute resolution under ICANN rules.122 ICANN also adopted rules for domain
name dispute resolution.123 The rules provide uniform standards for complaints,
private resolution panels, and power of panels.124 A number of organizations,
including the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), established dispute
resolution mechanisms to comply with the ICANN rules.125 The WIPO panels have
(June 10, 1998) (explaining the relationship between assigning IP addresses and assignment
of domain names) [hereinafter White Paper].
117
See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8826; 8827 (Feb. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Green Paper].
118
See White Paper, at 31741 (summarizing process for developing Green Paper). The
Green Paper actually was a proposal with a request for comments. See Green Paper, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 8827. The policy statement emerged from the comment process. White Paper, 63
Fed. Reg. at 31741 (explaining Green Paper). Nevertheless, the final policy statement is
popularly known as the “Green Paper,” as well.
119
White Paper, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31749.
120
Under solicitation number 52SBNT9C1020, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology solicited a sole source contract from ICANN. The United States government and
ICANN entered into a memorandum of understanding that provided ground rules for
ICANN. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 521 (2d ed.
2001). The relationship among ICANN, registries, and registrars is summarized in Dotster,
Inc. v. ICANN, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
121
See Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en
/udrp/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
122
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN, ¶ 4 (Oct. 24, 1999), http://
www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
123
Id.
124
See, e.g., Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, supra note 121.
125
See Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service for Generic Top-Level Domains,
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resolved several thousand disputes, although WIPO’s Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy has been subjected to sharp criticism.126 I am a member of the panel for
WIPO dispute resolution.127
Though the ICANN dispute resolution system is limited to disputes alleging that
domain names interfere with trademarks, a broader power exists as well.128 Registries are obligated by standard ICANN terms to terminate domain names when the
holder engages in “abuse.”129 In October 2008, the ICANN staff issued a report on
registration abuse policies, critical of the lack of uniform policies in applying the
abuse standard.130 Nevertheless, the abuse policies are potentially available to use
domain names as leverage to enforce a broader set of legal duties. Enforcing an
international or foreign adjudicatory decision against Internet domain names can be
an effective supplement to traditional judgment execution against tangible property.
The domain registry would be the “sheriff,” acting on a “writ of execution.”131 As
the ICANN Staff Report indicated, more uniform policies are needed to make clear
what “judgments” are entitled to enforcement and what process is due before a
domain name is revoked.132
E. Immunity for Intermediaries
Tort liability for intermediaries might impede broad access. On the other hand,
intermediaries are attractive targets to satisfy the transborder jurisdiction problem,
considered in Part I.F. This tension concerned the Washington Group. We
brainstormed about two directions for legal intervention: recognizing an immunity
for intermediaries, and establishment of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism
to address most claims of harm resulting from Internet-based content.133 The immunity we considered was codified in section 230 of the Communications Decency

WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/gtld/index.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
126
See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 96–101 (2000).
127
WIPO Domain Name Panelists, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo
.int/amc/en/domains/panel/panelists-html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
128
See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 122, at ¶ 4.
129
MARIKA KONINGS, GNSO ISSUES REPORT ON REGISTRATION ABUSE POLICIES 11
(2008) available at http://gnso.icann.org/issues/registration-abuse/gnso-issues-report
-registration-abuse-policies-29Oct08.pdf [hereinafter ABUSE REPORT].
130
Id. at 5.
131
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Will the Judgment-Proof Own Cyberspace?, 32 INT’L LAW. 1121,
1148 (1998).
132
ABUSE REPORT, supra note 129, at 45; see also id.
133
See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
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Act,134 for everything except intellectual property, and in the safe harbor provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).135
Alternative dispute resolution would reduce intermediary concerns about
liability because it could reduce the uncertainty and costs of litigation in the regular
courts, and because it could limit remedies to removal of the accused content. Even
if such systems did not preempt traditional judicial processes and remedies—which
would be difficult to do without an international treaty—it would divert many
controversies into the alternative system. The alternative dispute resolution ideas
were partially codified in the Domain Name Dispute Resolution system mandated
as a requirement for Domain Name registrars,136 and in the procedural provisions of
the DMCA safe harbor.137
F. Jurisdiction
Figuring out how the Internet should be regulated involved figuring out how
prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction138 should work.139 Legal jurisdiction is
fundamentally local, aligned with the boundaries of sovereign power; the Internet
is inherently global, crossing sovereign boundaries.
A number of early cases, some involving pre-Internet technologies such as dialup bulletin boards, crystallized concerns that traditional doctrines of adjudicative
jurisdiction might be unsuitable for the Internet.140 The early case law was synthe
134

Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137 (1996), (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230
(2006)).
135
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a) 112 Stat. 2877
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006)). The Safe Harbor Provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act were brokered to a significant degree by Washington
Group member Ron Plesser, who had chaired the telecommunications section of President
Clinton’s Transition Team.
136
See supra Part I.D.
137
To qualify for the immunity, a service provider must remove material when it receives
notice directed to its designated agent claiming that the material infringes a copyright. The
notice must meet requirements defined in the statute. The originator of removed material is
entitled to notice and to have the material put back up unless the person claiming copyright
infringement files suit for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)–(3) (2006); id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
138
Known as “personal jurisdiction” in the United States. See Michael D. Ramsey,
International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 271, 296 (2009).
139
Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the power to make rules. Adjudicatory jurisdiction
refers to the power to adjudicate alleged rule violations. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 785 (2009) (distinguishing between prescriptive and
adjudicatory jurisdiction); Ramsey, supra note 138, at 295–96 (same).
140
Compare CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264–66 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding personal jurisdiction in Ohio over a Texas resident who purposefully directed
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sized by the district court in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,141
which articulated a “sliding scale,” relied on in many subsequent cases.142 Zippo held
that passive web sites should not be subject to jurisdiction merely because they were
visible in the forum state, but that contracts involving knowing and repeated transmission of files to and from the forum state would support jurisdiction.143 In between
these two extremes, jurisdiction should depend on the degree of interactivity built
into the web site.144
I wrote two law review articles in the mid-1990s summarizing the state of the
debate.145 At first, it was hard to get the American Bar Association and others
interested in the question. The prevailing view among lawyers was that the Internet
was a toy and would never become a significant channel for professional interaction
or for commerce. Nevertheless, some of us in the bar, the industry, and the academic
and policy communities argued about how to adapt traditional jurisdiction concepts
to the realities of the Internet.146
The two poles in the debate were framed by David Johnson (a member of the
Washington Group) and David Post, on the one hand, and Jack Goldsmith, on the
other.147 In 1997, as I was moving from the faculty of Villanova University School
of Law to become the Dean at Chicago-Kent College, I organized a law review
symposium including Johnson and Goldsmith to explore the debate among several
of us about Internet jurisdiction.148
Post and Johnson argued that, “[C]yberspace—is creating a realm of human
interaction in which . . . physical location and physical space are becoming both

business activities toward Ohio by knowingly entering into a contract with CompuServe, an
Ohio resident, and then “deliberately” and “repeatedly” transmitting files to Ohio), and Inset
Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding personal
jurisdiction because advertising on the Internet constituted purposeful doing of business in
Connecticut because “unlike television and radio advertising, the advertisement is available
continuously to any Internet user”), with Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295,
301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction based on passive web site alone;
distinguishing CompuServe).
141
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
142
Id. at 1124.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Will the Judgment-Proof Own Cyberspace?, 32 INT’L LAW. 1121 (1998).
146
Perritt, Jurisdiction in Cyberpsace, supra note 145, at 4.
147
See infra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
148
See Symposium, Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
Xi (1998).
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indeterminate and functionally irrelevant.”149 “Cyberspace needs and can create its
own law and legal institutions.”150 Jack Goldsmith argued that cyberspace is not
“hermetically separated from the ‘real’ world.”151 “The easiest way to control illegal
cross-border information flows is to enforce the regulation against the local assets
of the foreign supplier of the information.”152
The Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of the National Academy of Sciences convened a committee on “Global Networks and Local Values” in
the late 1990s to consider these questions.153 The committee’s report154 stopped short
of making policy recommendations, but observed that “extraterritorial enforcement
of national laws is possible in principle, [but] this generally presupposes that the
nation-state can exercise jurisdiction over some element of the transnational
activity—e.g., by seizing local property or by restricting access to its market.”155
At the turn of the century, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
undertook an effort to negotiate an international convention on adjudicatory jurisdiction and transnational enforcement of judgments in the international e-commerce
context.156 Expert groups convened by the conference157 considered the idea of
“targeting” as a principle for localizing Internet activity: targeting consumers in a
149

David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards
a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1055, 1057–58 (1998).
150
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
151
Jack Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1119, 1119 (1998).
152
Id. at 1125.
153
Global Networks and Local Values, COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMM. BD., http://sites
.nationalacademies.org/CSTB/CompletedProjects/CSTB_042333. I served as a member of
the committee. Faculty Biographies: Henry H. Perritt, Jr., IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF
LAW (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/hperritt/.
154
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL
NETWORKS AND LOCAL VALUES: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT GERMANY AND THE UNITED
STATES (2001), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10033.html.
155
Id. at 192.
156
Press Release, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Geneva Round Table
on Electronic Commerce an Private International Law (Sept. 2, 2001), available at http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop.press01e.html. I was an active participant in the resulting
activities. See id.
157
See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Electronic Commerce and the
Internet (Press Release Including Conclusions and Recommendations) (Sept. 2, 1999)
(announcing round table of experts in Geneva), http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=
events.details&year=1999&varevent=63; HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION (Catherine Kessedjian,
ed., 2000), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd12.pdf [hereinafter Ottawa
Report].
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particular country would support jurisdiction; unsophisticated sites not engaging in
targeting would not be subject to jurisdiction elsewhere based on the web site
alone.158
Early in the activities of the Conference, I encouraged the United States State
Department representative to reach out to stakeholders and to get them involved.
There would be little point in developing a draft convention only to have significant
political interests in the United States torpedo it. Representatives of the entertainment industry (led by Disney) and representatives of the Internet industry were
split.159 The entertainment industry favored expansive jurisdictional rules because
they wanted to be able to sue alleged copyright infringers in United States courts.160
The Internet industry, particularly internet service providers (ISPs), wanted restrictive jurisdictional rules because they wanted to insulate themselves from litigation
in foreign forums.161 The French Yahoo! case was on everyone’s mind.162 Because
of the conflict between the two most important stakeholders, the United States
government was unable to take a position on the more important issues at the center
of the effort. This frustrated and annoyed the non-U.S. participants, and the result
was essentially to abandon the effort to craft an international convention.163
The Zippo formula, while incomplete, provided the key for the convergence on
a set of principles generally followed now in hundreds of cases.164 In them, the
158

Ottawa Report, supra note 157, at 7.
See generally Mary Shannon Martin, Keep it Online: The Hague Convention and the
Need for Online Alternative Dispute Resolution in International Business-to-Consumer ECommerce, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 125, 136–41 (2002) (discussing different views in relation to
the convention).
160
See Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual Property, Electronic Commerce and the Preliminary
Draft Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 581, 594–97
(2001) (discussing intellectual property rights in the context of the convention).
161
See id. at 597–98 (discussing concerns related to electronic commerce).
162
In the Yahoo! case, a French court had ordered Yahoo! to block access to materials on
Nazism that violated French law. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction; summarizing procedural history). Yahoo! unsuccessfully argued that “there was
no technical solution which would enable it to comply fully with the terms of the court
order.” Id. at 1203. The United States litigation was an attempt by Yahoo! to block
enforcement of the French judgment in the United States.
163
See Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and
the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can the Hague Conference
Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 193 (2001) (discussing lack of consensus among
participants).
164
See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir.
2002) (adopting the Zippo model to find personal jurisdiction); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC,
190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (using the reasoning of Zippo to find personal jurisdiction
over the defendant); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997)
(adopting the Zippo formula).
159
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Goldsmith view largely has prevailed: the customary requirement for “minimum
contacts” and “fair play and substantial justice” have proved workable for the vast
majority of Internet cases.165 Pressure for new jurisdictional concepts or for an
international treaty has largely evaporated.
Nevertheless, the focus on enforcing judgments against local assets puts pressure on immunity for intermediaries166 because intermediaries usually have local
assets and they represent deep pockets.
G. Electronic Commerce
1. In General
Realization of the Internet’s potential to transform private markets required the
proliferation of electronic commerce, or “e-commerce.” E-commerce had existed
since the 1960s, through dedicated communication circuits and by means of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) standards that permitted disparate proprietary computer systems to make sense of the data sent and received.167 Electronic funds
transfer, ATM machines, and point-of-sale credit card terminals were in wide
acceptance by the end of the 1980s.168 The spread of the Internet made an easy-touse interface available in the form of web browsers, and simplified the processes of
establishing computer-to-computer connections.

165

See CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding
specific jurisdiction but not general jurisdiction in dispute between two Internet-based
college course catalog providers). Compare id. at 1075 (finding Internet connections from
California insufficient to meet demanding standard of “continuous and systematic” for
general jurisdiction), with id. 1078–79 (concluding that specific jurisdiction was satisfied
because defendant expressly aimed its downloading requests to California and the dispute
related to those contacts).
166
See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text.
167
See C.J. Anumba & K. Ruikar, Electronic Commerce in Construction-Trends and
Prospects, 11 AUTOMATION CONSTRUCTION 265, 267 (2002) (noting the impact of EDI);
Janine S. Hiller & Don Lloyd Cook, From Clipper Ships to Clipper Chips: The Evolution of
Payment Systems for Electronic Commerce, 17 J.L. & COM. 53, 55 (1997) (noting that the
evolution of the internet begain in the 1960s).
168
Anumba & Ruikar, supra note 167, at 268.
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1995 was a pivotal year. Jeff Bezos launched Amazon.com,169 and Dell and
Cisco both began to use the Internet to interact directly with customers.170 By mid2011, few types of consumer goods were not sold online. E-commerce flourished
on the Internet despite early concerns about payment systems, lack of consumer
trust, consumer reluctance to incur transaction costs of using the web, and reluctance
of service or product suppliers to risk their intellectual property.171 Most of these
concerns proved unwarranted. In the mid-1990s many argued that e-commerce
would require the development of entirely new payment systems.172 I disagreed. In
two law review articles written in the late 1990s,173 I argued that the existing credit
card systems would prove perfectly adequate and acceptable to consumers. By 2000,
it was clear that this was the case,174 largely because of the dispute resolution system
built in to credit card transactions.175
Concerns about inconvenience were mitigated by one-click shopping, popularized by Amazon, beginning in 1999.176 The one-click method reduced the number
169

Amazon enjoyed explosive growth. Sales revenue grew 838% from 1996 to 1997, and
customer accounts grew 738% in the same period. Letter from Jeffrey P. Bezos, Founder and
Chief Executive Officer, Amazon.com to Shareholders (1997), available at http://media
.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/97/97664/reports/Shareholderletter97. The impact on
perceptions of e-commerce was almost as dramatic. If so many people were willing to buy
books through the web, they might be willing to buy other things.
170
See Press Release, Cisco, Cisco Broadens Internet Access to the Desktop, Acquires
Internet Junction, Inc. (Sept. 6, 1995) available at http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/1995/corp
_090695.html.
171
See infra notes 171–74 and accompanying text.
172
Compare Sarah Jane Hughes, A Case for Regulating Cyberpayments, 51 ADMIN. L.
REV. 809, 813–14 (1999) (noting the demise of most cyberpayments systems as e-commerce
developed), with Kerry Lynn Macintosh, How to Encourage Global Electronic Commerce:
The Case for Private Currencies on the Internet, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 733, 738–39 (1998)
(arguing that the Internet needs its own private electronic currencies), and Robert F. Stankey,
Internet Payment Systems: Legal Issues Facing Businesses, Consumers and Payment Service
Providers, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 11, 12 (1998) (arguing that the
percentage of credit card transactions will decline as e-commerce grows), and Hiller & Cook,
supra note 167, at 98 (“To the extent electronic commerce grows, it is certain that it will not
flourish unless acceptable systems for payment are available.”).
173
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and Technological Infrastructures for Electronic Payment
Systems, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 1, 2 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Payment
Infrastructures for Open Systems, 3 DATA LAW REPORT 1, 20 (1995).
174
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of
ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 675, 676 (2000) (explaining why intermediary-provided
dispute resolution, such as credit card charge-backs and escrow arrangements, prove more
attractive in practice than independent third-party mechanisms such as arbitration or
mediation).
175
Id. at 690–94 (explaining credit card charge-back system).
176
Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail
Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 1002 (2008) (noting Amazon’s “renouned” one-click
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of steps a consumer must take to order an item from an e-commerce site, and
relieved a consumer from having to re-enter all of his basic information, such as
name, address, and credit card information.177
On the other hand, the easy replication of information in digital form undermined traditional business models in some industries, particularly those for music
and video entertainment. The result was a war over enforcement of copyright on the
Internet, which still clouds the future of e-commerce.178
2. Copyright
Proliferation of personal computers set off alarm bells in the community of
intellectual property rights holders, particularly those whose business models
depended on protecting copyright.179 As the Internet became more popular, major
organizations of rights holders aggressively promoted copy protection schemes and
launched aggressive litigation campaigns against perceived infringers.180
The ongoing controversy was shaped by the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), extension of the copyright term, imposition of
liability on major unlicensed file sharing services, extension of secondary liability
to intermediaries, and constriction of the fair use privilege.181
a. DMCA

patent).
177
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
see generally id. at 1360–66 (suggesting Amazon’s patent for one-click ordering might be
invalid).
178
See infra notes 178–211 and accompanying text.
179
In 1974, the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) reported to Congress on the relationship of new technologies and the effectiveness
of copyright law. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1979), available at http://digital-law-online.info
/CONTU/contu18.html [hereinafter CONTU report]. Oddly, it limited its work to copyright
protection for computer programs and the potential of photocopiers to undermine copyright.
See Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced
Technological Era, 96 HARV. L. REV. 450, 451 and n. 10 (1982) (noting technology’s
potential to undermine the ability of copyright owners to control distribution of their work
and noting the limitation of CONTU).
180
See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 695, 721–25 (2011) (describing RIAA’s (Recording Industry Association of
America) litigation initiative resulting in more than 30,000 civil action claims).
181
See infra notes 181–211 and accompanying text.
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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act182 prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to protected works183 and the use of
technologies that facilitate circumvention.184 This encourages copy protection, which
reduces user flexibility in working with copyrighted materials.185
b. Extension of Copyright Term
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,186 the Supreme Court of the United States rejected 7–2,
a constitutional challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),187 which
extended copyright protection from creation until seventy years after the author’s
death and extended the term for copyrights already existing at the time of
enactment.188 The extension reduces the portion of works in the public domain.189
c. Secondary Liability
The Supreme Court of the United States extended liability for secondary
infringement of copyright in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,190
holding that the distributor of music file-sharing software could be secondarily liable
for direct infringement by users of the software upon proof that the distributors
clearly expressed intent that the software be used for infringing activities.191
So far, lower courts have resisted attempts to expand secondary liability in other
contexts. In Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., the plaintiffs asked the
district court to hold YouTube liable for secondary infringement for failing to make
it easier for rights holders to cause infringing material posted by others to be
removed from the YouTube site.192 The court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, holding that they satisfied the requirements of the DMCA safe harbor
by insisting on identification of specific infringing items before taking steps to

182

Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006).
184
Id. § 1201(b).
185
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Flanking the DRM Maginot Line Against New Music Markets,
16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 113 (2007) (explaining and criticizing copy protection efforts).
186
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
187
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827–28 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304
(1994)).
188
Id.
189
Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 199, 201 (2003).
190
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
191
Id. at 928–41.
192
718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516–19, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
183
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remove them and that they did not lose the safe harbor protection by failing to
deploy more aggressive infringement monitoring software.193
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service Ass’n, the court of appeals
affirmed dismissal of an action brought against credit card processors for copyright
infringement arising from their cardholders’ downloading copyrighted images from
third-party web sites.194 The court of appeals, agreeing with the district court, found
that the credit card companies had no direct connection to that infringement.195
Although credit cards made it easier for web sites to profit from infringing activity,
infringement could occur even without payment.196 Perfect 10 did not allege
“specific acts” by the credit card companies intended to encourage infringement.197
Finally, even though the credit card processors could have stopped processing credit
card payments to the infringing web sites, that did not mean that failure to do so
equated to vicarious infringement.198 The court easily rejected a claim of contributory trademark infringement, finding that the credit card companies had no power
to control the activities of the infringing sites.199
Potential secondary liability by intermediaries undercuts the immunity considered in Part II.E of this Article, and thus can lead to shutting out riskier forms of
content from the Internet. The DMCA’s safe harbor for intermediaries, analyzed in
Part II.E.2, combined with the result in the Viacom case,200 mitigates this risk.
d. Fair Use
By far the most important privilege within the Internet context is the fair use
privilege, codified in Title 17, section 107.201
193

Id. at 528–29.
494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
195
Id. at 796.
196
Id. at 796–97.
197
Id. at 802.
198
Id. at 803.
199
Id. at 807.
200
See supra notes 191–92.
201
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). This section was intended to codify decisional law, rather than
to expand or alter it. See Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, Inc. 482 F. Supp. 741, 745 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Section 107 explains that whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is fair use, and thus
non-infringing, is to be determined by consideration of a number of factors including:
194

(1)
(2)
(3)

the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or as for non-profit educational purposes;
the nature of the copyrighted work;
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
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The Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.202
and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.203 noted that the last factor—the market
effect of the purported fair use—is the most important.204 In recent years, the first
factor—the purpose and character of the use—has gained in importance as
“transformative” activities by accused infringers have been recognized as socially
beneficial.205
Early cases involving the Internet took a restrictive view of fair use. In UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,206 the district court denied the fair use defense
of an Internet Web service that purchased tens of thousands of popular CDs and
copied recordings onto its Web servers so that subscribers could play the recordings
from wherever they had Internet connections.207 In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies,
Inc.,208 the Federal Circuit held that the Copyright Act did not preempt enforcement
of a broad contractual prohibition on reverse engineering contained in a shrink-wrap
agreement, even though the contract had the effect of prohibiting what would be fair
use under the Copyright Act.209
More recently, courts have breathed life back into fair use. In Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp.,210 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part summary judgment in favor of search engine operators accused of
copyright infringement for presenting “thumbnail” versions of copyrighted images
on its search engine. The court stated that the uses were transformative due to the
public benefit of the search engine and because use of the plaintiff’s images in the
thumbnails did not harm the market for the plaintiff’s images or the value of his
images.211 The plaintiff was denied fair use with respect to full-size reproductions
of the photographs.212
H. Security and Surveillance

(4)

the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1)–(4).
202
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
203
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
204
Id. at 574; Sony, 464 U.S. at 476 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
205
See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the search
engine presentation of thumbnail sketches of copyrighted photographs to be transformative).
206
92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
207
Id. at 350, 352.
208
320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
209
Id. at 1317, 1324.
210
Kelly, 280 F.3d 934.
211
Id. at 944.
212
Id. at 948.
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The shift of information and communications to the Internet spawned concern
from the law enforcement and intelligence communities that many of their traditional investigatory and intelligence-collection tools would become ineffective. The
result has been the development of a variety of legal constraints and privileges
related to electronic surveillance.
1. Wiretap Act and Stored Communications Act
Law enforcement authorities may compel access to communications and
electronic messages and files by obtaining warrants and other orders under the
provisions of the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act,213 or by obtaining a traditional search warrant under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.214
The requirements for accessing stored electronic communications under the
Stored Communications Act (SCA) are less demanding than the requirements for
accessing live wire, oral, or electronic communications under the Wiretap Act or
under Rule 41.215 The procedures for intercepting stored communications and for
accessing remote computing facilities are more flexible because the Fourth Amendment does not limit access to records kept by third parties.216 The SCA addresses
searches and seizures of three different types of stored communications: (a)contents
of stored electronic communications that have been in electronic storage for 180
days or less; (b)contents of stored electronic communications that have been in
electronic storage for more than 180 days; and (c)records, not involving content,
concerning electronic communications.217 Stored communications in storage for 180
days or less may be accessed pursuant to either federal or state warrants.218 Information stored for more than 180 days may be accessed with a warrant, with notice to
213

18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006) (authorizing for interception of wire, oral, and electronic
communications); 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006) (noting stored communications); see Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (assessing
statutory damages against Secret Service for violating Stored Wire and Electronic
Communications and Transactional Records Access Act).
214
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. Important differences exist between Rule 41 and Title III wiretap
orders: a search warrant may be issued by a magistrate judge, but a wiretap warrant must be
issued by an Article III judge; any federal law enforcement officer or attorney for the
government may apply for a search warrant, but a wiretap warrant requires approval by
designated high officials in the Justice Department; a search warrant may be issued upon a
finding of probable cause but a wiretap warrant requires additional findings, including a
finding that other investigative procedures are impracticable. Compare id., with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516, 2518 (2000).
215
See supra note 213.
216
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–43 (1976).
217
18 U.S.C. § 2703.
218
Id. § 2703(a).
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the subscriber or customer under an administrative, grand jury, or trial subpoena; or
pursuant to a court order based on a governmental showing that the information
sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”219
Transactional records concerning stored electronic communications may be
accessed pursuant to a warrant, pursuant to a court order such as that necessary for
information stored in excess of 180 days, pursuant to a formal written request
relevant to a law enforcement investigation concerning telemarketing fraud, or
pursuant to an administrative subpoena authorized by federal or state statute.220 The
Stored Communications Act immunizes e-mails stored on the servers of an e-mail
service provider from civil subpoenas.221
Pen/Trap orders222 are used for obtaining stored data such as Twitter screen
names and subscriber information, the dates and times such screen names were used,
IP addresses used, and information on payment methods.223
In United States v. Warshak,224 the court of appeals held that:
[A] subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of emails “that are stored with, or sent or received
through, a commercial ISP.”. . . The government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s
emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.
Therefore, because they did not obtain a warrant, the government agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they obtained
the contents of Warshak’s emails. Moreover, to the extent that
the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such
emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.225

219

Id. § 2703(b)–(d); see also Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 816 F. Supp. at 432–33
(awarding damages for violation of ECPA stored communications provisions but finding no
Title I interception).
220
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006).
221
See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 975–76 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(reviewing case law and holding that immunity extended to certain private Facebook
postings).
222
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2006).
223
See In re: § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D. Va. 2011) (rejecting challenge
to sealed SCA order compelling disclosure by Twitter). The court held that because the
government did not seek access to communications content, it need not meet the higher
standards of content disclosure under the Stored Communications Act. Id. at 434–35.
224
631 F.3d at 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
225
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (internal citations omitted). Although the government
obtained access to about 27,000 e-mails without informing the subscriber, the court held that
the evidence obtained from the e-mails could not be excluded from a criminal trial because
the government relied in good faith on the Stored Communications Act. Id.

32

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:000

2. Carnivore
Carnivore (renamed “DCS-1000” in 2001) was a controversial system used by
the FBI to facilitate court-ordered intercepts of Internet communications and
transactional data, including e-mail and Web communications.226 The Carnivore
controversy illustrates adaptation of traditional surveillance technologies and law
to networked environments. Before Carnivore existed, an ISP was often unable to
comply with an order because most widely available sniffer software intercepted too
much. If an ISP turned over to the FBI more information than was authorized under
a court order, the FBI might not be able to use any of the information as evidence
in a subsequent prosecution. Getting too much information constitutes a failure to
“minimize” the eavesdropping and often justifies suppression of all the information,
not just that portion that exceeds the court order.
Accordingly, technical personnel at the FBI’s Quantico laboratory undertook to
program limitations onto traditional sniffer functionality so that whenever an ISP
was unable to supply only the information authorized by a court order, the FBI could
itself deploy a system that would obtain only the authorized information.227
When word of the system’s existence leaked, much controversy erupted, leading
to congressional hearings.228 Attorney General Janet Reno, after evaluating competing proposals, selected the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute (IITRI)

226

For an extensive commentary on Carnivore, see Maricela Segura, Note, Is Carnivore
Devouring your Privacy? 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 231, 235–36 (2001). Ted Bridis, FBI Stops
Using Carnivore Wiretap Software, USATODAY.COM (Jan. 1, 2009, 2:29 AM), http://www
.usatoday.com/tech/news/surveillance/2005-01-19-carnivore-obsolete-x.htm. Carnivore was
originally modified sniffer software developed by the FBI and deployed on a Pentium III
microcomputer. Jeff Tyson, How Carnivore Worked, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, http://www
.howstuffworks.com/carnivore3.htm. When the Carnivore system was attached to a local area
network segment by one-way tap, the FBI could execute a court order to eavesdrop on
electronic communications. Id. Depending on the content of the order, Carnivore was set to
intercept and record only those packets containing certain IP addresses, e-mail addresses, or
text strings. See id.
The network interface card installed with the Carnivore software “saw” all of the packets
traversing the particular network segment into which Carnivore was connected, but only
those packets meeting the specified criteria were recorded for further processing. Id. The
recorded packets were written as a file on a zip drive, along with a file containing the settings
for the session that resulted in the creation of that data file. Id. See generally ILL. INST. OF
TECH. RESEARCH INST., INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT
(2000), available at http://cpic.org/privacy/carnivore/carniv_final.pdf [hereinafter
CARNIVORE REPORT]
227
CARNIVORE REPORT, supra note 226, at 1.
228
Id. at 3.
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to perform a review.229 I was the senior legal member of the review team, which
issued its final report in December 2000.230 We concluded that,
When Carnivore is used in accordance with a Title III order, it
provides investigators with no more information than is permitted by a given court order . . . . [that] Carnivore reduces, but
does not eliminate, risk of both intentional and unintentional
unauthorized acquisition of electronic communication information by FBI personnel, but introduces little additional risk of
acquisition by persons other than FBI personnel.231
The report made a number of specific technical recommendations to prevent errors
in setting up Carnivore in a particular deployment and to improve audit trails.232
3. CALEA
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)233 obligates telecommunication service providers to design their networks to facilitate
eavesdropping by law enforcement authorities. All of CALEA’s required capabilities are expressly premised on the condition that any information will be obtained
“pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization.”234 The FCC may not, under
CALEA, “require carriers to provide the government with information that ‘is not
authorized to be intercepted.’”235 CALEA applies to “telecommunications carriers,”
but not to “information services.”236 Drawing the line between the two has engendered much controversy.
In U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set
aside certain parts of the FCC’s CALEA rules.237 The court approved the FCC’s
interpretation of call-identifying information, available under CALEA, to include
antenna tower location for cell phone calls.238 The court embraced the FCC’s
reasoning that antenna tower information simply puts law enforcement agencies in
229

Id. at 2.
Id.
231
Id. at xii.
232
Id. at xiv–xv.
233
47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006).
234
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 465 (2000) (citing 47 U.S.C §
1002(a)(1)–(2)).
235
Id. at 465–66.
236
Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)).
237
U.S. Telecom, 227 F.3d at 450, 453.
238
Id. at 463.
230
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the same position they had in monitoring POTS (plain old telephone service), where
the telephone number provides location information.239 The court also approved the
requirement to make packet-mode data available.240
The litigation was a precursor to several controversies involved in Carnivore:
the argument about Smith v. Maryland’s241 distinction between content and dialed
digits, the argument over interception of new data, such as antenna location, to make
up for the absence of location information implicit with wire line wiretaps, and the
challenge of separating header and payload data from packet-based communications—an issue strongly influencing some criticisms of Carnivore for over-collecting in pen mode.
In 2005, the FCC extended CALEA to Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and
to broadband access providers,242 a decision approved in American Council on
Education v. FCC.243 The FCC rejected the government’s proposal that new technologies receive advance approval, finding that implementing the “proposal would have
a chilling effect on innovation.”244
4. Mobile Device Location Information
District courts and courts of appeals disagree about whether “prospective cell
site” data—information showing the location of a cell phone user—is available
under the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, or the Pen/Trap Act or a
combination of them, or whether probable cause must be shown.
In In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government,245 the
court of appeals held that the magistrate judge “erred in allowing her impressions
of the general expectation of privacy of citizens to transform that standard into
anything else. . . . th[e] standard is a lesser one than probable cause . . . .”246 Whether
the probable cause or the subsection (d) requirement applies may depend on the
length of time for which historical cell site information (CSI) is sought.247 A magis
239

Id. 463–64.
Id. at 464–65.
241
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
242
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Services, 20 FCC Rcd. 14989 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 CALEA Order].
243
451 F.3d 226 (explaining requirements of CALEA, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010, to make
certain telecommunications networks available for electronic eavesdropping by law
enforcement agencies).
244
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Services, 21 FCC Rcd. 5360, 5395–96 (2006).
245
620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
246
Id. at 313.
247
See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Information, No. 11-MC-0113 (JO), 2011 WL 679925, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
240
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trate judge in another circuit relied in part on the Third Circuit’s analysis to exercise
his discretion to require probable cause for access to historical CSI for a period of
113 days.248
In In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Authority,249 the district court rejected access to prospective cell site
location data under the wiretap statute (or under the Pen/Trap or Stored Communications Act) because “[c]ell site data does not reflect the ‘contents’ of a communication.”250 It also denied access to the data under the Stored Communications Act
subscriber records category.251 In In re Application of United States for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register Device, A Trap and Trace
Device, and for Geographic Location Information,252 reviewing the other district
court decisions to date,253 the district court concluded that the only authority for
prospective cell site information was Rule 41, necessitating a finding of probable
cause.254 Other cases reach conflicting results.255
2011) (granting order under subsection (d) and distinguishing historical data for longer
period, for which probable cause is necessary); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006)).
248
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical CellSite Information, No. 10-MC-0897, 2010 WL 5437209, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010).
249
396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
250
Id. at 758.
251
Id. (referring to SCA subscriber records category under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)).
252
497 F. Supp. 2d 301 (D.P.R. 2007).
253
Id. at 303–04.
254
Id. at 311.
255
Compare In re Application of the U. S. for an Order, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 826–36
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting the government’s hybrid theory) and In re Application of the
U.S., 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that a judicial officer should not
be able to extrapolate from separate and independent statutory provisions authority to obtain
“real time” cell location data on anything less than a showing of probable cause), and In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that
combination of CALEA and the Wiretap Act without probable cause did not authorize
government to obtain location information by means of pen/trap order), and In re Application
of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information, 412
F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (rejecting access to cell site location data, reasoning that
the three statutes—the SCA, the CALEA, and the Pen/Trap Statute—did not authorize the
requested eavesdropping), and In re Application of the U.S. for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d
294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding certification of relevance under Pen/Trap statute insufficient
and that probable cause was required) and In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace
Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (classifying
prospective cell site data as tracking device information under 18 U.S.C. § 3117 and not as
minimal Pen/Trap information, rejecting government’s hybrid statutory argument, and stating
access without showing a probable cause would raise serious Fourth Amendment concerns),
with In re Application of U.S. for an Order, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682–83 (W.D. La. 2006)
(granting request for cell site location data under the same argument based on the three
statutes).
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Continued confusion over this issue is likely to result in more intrusive government surveillance based on mobile Internet technologies. If Congress intervenes, it
is not certain whether it will act to protect personal privacy or to facilitate what law
enforcement and intelligence communities say is necessary.
II. CONFRONTING THREATS TO THE FUTURE
The Internet has established itself as one of the dominant means for political
communication, one of the principal channels for commerce, and is becoming the
most important distribution mechanism for art and entertainment.256 As these trends
continue, certain legal and policy issues will intensify.
During its first two decades, the Internet encountered a variety of actual or
perceived threats to its continued growth and to its fundamental architectural
characteristics. As the following sections of this Article show, some of the apparent
threats turned out not to be real, and a combination of entrepreneurial and legal
creativity accommodated others. The future also contains potential threats. Some
will not materialize, while others may undermine the Internet’s constitution, diverting politics, social interaction, commerce, and art into other infrastructures, leaving
the Internet as an historical shooting star. Still others might fundamentally crush the
grassroots energy on both consumer and supplier sides that have made the Internet
a success.
The most important of the threats are the replacement of the Internet’s decentralized character with an oligopolistic cluster of proprietary empires, the loss of net
neutrality and discrimination against content in other forms, the eclipse of the public
domain by holders of copyright monopolies, chilling of behaviorally targeted
advertising, and overreaction to perceived security threats.257
A. Proprietary Empires
Proprietary empires already have emerged amid the Internet’s success: Google
for searches, Amazon for e-commerce, iTunes for music, and Netflix and Hulu for
video entertainment. So far, their imperial policies have been benign, even in the
case of Amazon, in facilitating market access by small entrepreneurs.258 Imperial
policies could change, however. If they do, the possibility of regulating through

256

See Shikar Ghosh, Making Sense of the Internet, HARV. BUS. REV. Mar.–Apr. 1998,
at 126–27.
257
See, e.g., Values and Principles, INTERNETSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.internetsociety
.org/node/21 (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
258
Jill Priluck, Ahead in the Cloud, SLATE (Nov. 24, 2010, 12:43 PM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/business/small_business/2010/11/ahead_in_the_cloud.html.
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technology is far more threatening to the Internet’s constitution than traditional
governmental regulation backed up by legal institutions.259
The Internet is defined by its open architecture, as explained in Part I.B, but
economic incentives exist to close the architecture. Most suppliers of services
through the Internet have an incentive to allow it to function as intended—freely
granting access to their own services to other suppliers performing complementary
services.260 Circumstances also exist, however, in which supplier self-interest is
served by blocking access. These typically involve a monopoly position by the one
denying access.
Monopolies may arise for several reasons. For example, a supplier may have
proprietary interconnection technologies protected by intellectual property law
offering features that distinguish it from competitors. In such circumstances,
suppliers of complementary products may be willing to pay higher-than-market rates
for access, so they can incorporate the proprietary features in the integrated offering
to consumers. They expect to earn more than enough revenue from the integrated
product to cover the supernormal fees paid to the owner of the proprietary features.
The owner of the proprietary features makes a rational economic decision as to
whether its profits will be larger if it charges a competitive access fee and has a
larger customer base, or if it charges a higher fee261 resulting in a smaller customer
base. Apple provides an example of this phenomenon, resulting at different times
in the adoption of competing philosophies. At some points, and for some products,
Apple maintained a “closed system”: no independent supplier of complementary
products and services is allowed to interconnect them with Apple’s proprietary
features unless it enters into a contract and pays what are presumably supernormal
fees to Apple.262 Other times, as with iPhone applications, Apple has adopted an
open approach in which it provides the necessary interface specifications and
privileges to the world, allowing entrepreneurs to develop their applications as they

259

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 81–82
(2006) (explaining how regulation by technological restrictions is more subversive of liberty
than traditional legal regulation by the state).
260
See Complaint, at 15–17, United States v. WorldCom, Inc., Civ. Action No. 00-2789
(D.D.C. June 26, 2000) (describing incentives for networks confronted with network
externalities to interconnect) available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f5000/5051.pdf.
261
Economists would call this “monopoly rents.” See generally Anne O. Krueger, The
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974).
262
See Rui Li, Note, Antitrust, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Online Music
Industry: An Antitrust Analysis of Apple’s Combination of Services and Products, NAT’L L.
REV. 1–2, 5 (2011), available at http://www.natlawreview.com/article/antitrust-intellectual
-property-rights-and-online-music-industry-antitrust-analysis-apple-s-.
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wish.263 Thousands of Apps were available for the iPhone in early 2010.264 Millions
of iPhone users enthusiastically downloaded these Apps, resulting in higher profits
for Apple because of the sale of more iPhones, as well as higher profits for AT&T
and other iPhone service providers because consumers using the Apps use more
bandwidth for which they pay the service providers.265
The iPhone’s open architecture266 for applications did not result from any
intervention by the legal system. No court, legislature, or administrative agency told
Apple that it was forbidden to close the iPhone interfaces. Rather, it occurred
because Apple made an independent, self-interested economic judgment that an
open architecture would produce higher profits. The experience of the Internet and
e-commerce strongly reinforces the attractiveness of such an open approach.
Occasionally—especially in the early days of e-commerce267—offerors of web sites,
such as directories and indexes, occasionally embrace the business model in which
specific vendors would be included only if they paid a fee. In almost all cases these
business models were unsuccessful and were abandoned.268 Directories and indexes
proliferate. Almost none charge a fee for inclusion.269 The motivation for the
business model is premised on using free inclusion to fuel demand for other services
for which a fee is charged or by noneconomic motives.
Situations exist and are likely to recur, however, when suppliers are antagonistic
to this open architecture philosophy. Some of them have established businesses, the
outputs of which are being drawn into the Internet’s information infrastructure, and
the owners and operators of these businesses are unable to develop a business model
in which these outputs can be offered for free while still sustaining the enterprise.270
263

See Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. Santorelli, Seizing the Moment: Spectrum
Allocation Policy for the Wireless Broadband Century, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 13–14
(2010). But see id. at 42.
264
Matt Silverman, iPhone Apps List 2010: 700+ Apps Reviewed by Category,
MASHABLE TECH (Jan. 3, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/01/03/iphone-apps-2010/;
Davidson & Santorelli, supra note 263, at 13–14.
265
See Mike Bremin, Can’t We Enjoy Anything Without Paying for It??, TECHMENTO
TECH. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2011), http://techmento.com/2011/03/19/att_tethering_devices
_payup/.
266
Definition of: Open Architecture, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia
_term/0,2542,t=open+architecture&i=48446,00.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
267
In this context, “e-commerce” simply means developing and deploying Internet
services with a profit motive.
268
See, e.g., Barry Schwartz, Yahoo To Drop Paid Inclusion Program, SEARCH ENGINE
LAND (Oct. 15, 2009, 4:20 PM), http://searchengineland.com/yahoo-to-drop-paid-inclusion
-program-27852.
269
Barry Schwartz, Confirmed: Bing Tests Ads Within Organic Search Results, SEARCH
ENGINE LAND (July 22, 2011, 4:49 PM), http://searchengineland.com/bing-tests-ads-within
-organic-search-results-86957.
270
See Danny Sullivan, 2000 In Review: AdWords Launches; Yahoo Partners with
Google; GoTo Syndicates, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Feb. 1, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://
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Major record labels, film studios, and other owners of rights in entertainment
content are clear examples. In other cases, economic misfortune has confronted
established enterprises for reasons not directly associated with exploitation of their
outputs to the Internet.271 The owners and operators of these businesses are scrambling to find substantive revenue streams, which causes them to look greedily at the
possibility of generating revenue by charging for access to their outputs through the
Internet. The newspaper and magazine industries at the end of 2009 provide clear
examples.272
In most of these cases, the law does not need to get involved. The marketplace
will decide whether closed approaches are viable, or will force suppliers to embrace
the open architecture, or risk being driven from the market. In many instances, feebased services will survive and flourish. Thousands of lawyers pay substantial fees
for accessing court decisions and statutes offered through the Internet by Westlaw
and Lexis; millions of music fans pay iTunes ninety-nine cents per song or more to
download music; travelers expect to pay for airline tickets and hotel rooms through
the Internet. No serious analyst proposes that the law must intervene to force these
services to be made available for free.
Other circumstances exist, though, posing a danger to the well-being of economic life or to the viability of the Internet’s core philosophy, which present a
stronger case for legal intervention.273 The dynamics of a monopoly typically lead
searchengineland.com/2000-in-review-adwords-launches-yahoo-partners-with-google-34831.
271
See Reinventing the Newspaper, ECONOMIST, July 9, 2011, at 7–9 (discussing problems
facing news organizations).
272
See David Milstead, Newspapers’ Perilous Paywall Moment, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
Aug. 2010, at 30–35.
273
Microeconomic theory teaches that monopolists can and will charge a higher price for
the same good or service that would be priced lower in a competitive market. In a
competitive market, assuming that all firms have the same cost curve, any firm has an
incentive to sell at a price high enough for it to earn revenue even slightly in excess of cost.
No firm can charge a price higher than another firm because that would shift demand from
the firm charging the higher price to firms with a lower price. That means that the price for
every firm in the market is the price at which the marginal revenue curve crosses the
marginal cost curve. At a lower price, firms would lose money because their revenue does
not cover their costs; at a higher price, profits would be higher but other firms could gain
market share by charging a price that just covers cost.
The position of a monopolist is different because, by definition, it does not face the
competitive threat of any other firm offering a lower price. Having the flexibility to set its
price wherever it wants, the monopolist sets its price to maximize profits. Under the usual
assumptions of elastic demand (elastic demand means that consumers buy less at a higher
price and more at a lower price), the monopolist sets a higher price resulting in lower
demand, where the revenue gains are sufficient to offset the reduced demand. Because
consumers have to pay a higher price and consume less they are worse off. The difference
between the benefit to the monopolist and the loss to consumers is called the “net welfare
loss.”
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to two elements of public policy. The first, deeply embedded in the rationale for
public utility regulation, is that price controls should be imposed on monopolists
who enjoy natural monopolies.274 By limiting monopoly pricing, the State can
protect against reallocating resources from consumers to monopolists.
Second, the law can remove artificial barriers to entry. One such barrier to entry
is “predatory pricing” by the monopolist. Predatory pricing signifies that a monopolist, threatened by the prospect of a new entrant, will reduce prices in the short run
to a level below that at which the new entrant can earn a profit.275 A monopolist can
afford to do this, either because it can forego some of its monopoly profits in the
short run in order to retain its monopoly in the long run, or because it has banked
enough excess monopoly profits in the past to allow it to finance a short-term loss
as a good investment to increase prices later and reinstate its monopoly profits.
Antitrust law developed a complex set of rules to determine when predatory pricing
exists and when it should be illegal.276
Third, the law can protect against denials of access to essential facilities and
services by the monopolist.277 That, essentially, is what the debate over net neutrality
is all about.278

Monopolies are unstable in markets that have a competitive structure. A monopolist may
exist, for example if the monopolist was an innovator and entered the market with a product
as to which it was the only offeror, but the competitive market conditions mean that others
will enter charging prices less than the monopoly price and take market share away from the
original monopolist. So a monopoly can be maintained only under one or both of two
conditions: (1)the monopolist imposes artificial barriers to entry and is able to enforce them,
or (2)the size of the market is such that at a monopoly price, the monopolist (but not new
entrants) faces a declining cost-curve. The declining cost-curve case is called a “natural
monopoly.” In such conditions, if demand increases at the monopoly price, the monopolist
simply can produce more and, because his costs decline, still earn higher profits.
However, one of the central assumptions of microeconomic theory is that, at some point,
costs increase with increasing production. Increased shifts must be added at higher labor
costs, the price for raw materials increases, or congestion or other inefficiencies begin to
increase costs per unit. When a natural monopoly exists because at the initial level of demand
a monopolist faces a declining cost curve, the monopolist still confronts the threat that
demand will increase to the point that its costs will increase if it produces more. At that point,
there is room for new entrants because they probably can serve the increased demand at
lower costs than the monopolist. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY (7th ed., 1997).
274
See Charles W. Lamden, The Place of Accounting in Price Control, 18 ACCT. REV.,
Jan. 1943, at 26–27.
275
See Brocke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221–28
(1993).
276
See, e.g., Section 2 of the Sherman Act, at 15 U.S.C. § 2.
277
See PERRITT, supra note 72, at sec. 2.04[B] (2011 Supplement) (discussing “essential
facilities doctrine” in antitrust law).
278
See infra Part II.B.
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The greatest threat to enhanced social welfare resulting from the Internet’s open
architecture arises when a supplier of services at one layer seeks to extend its
services into other layers—in other words, to engage in vertical integration. Pursuit
of this strategy benefits from discouraging competing suppliers in the layers where
the vertically integrating enterprise has weaker competitive offerings. This situation
often arises when the market structure of one layer is a natural monopoly, because
of network effects or otherwise, while the market structure of adjacent layers is
inherently competitive.279
The vice when natural monopolies at one level are leveraged to create an
artificial monopoly at other levels is not the natural monopoly. By definition, a
natural monopoly is more efficient when it is allowed to run its course—at least until
the monopolist starts extracting monopoly rents.280 Instead, the vice is the artificial
exclusion of competition in adjacent layers where competition is the natural state.
Many parts of the Internet’s technologies present economies of scale. When
economies of scale exist, bigger is better—or at least more efficient—even though
the economies may not be strong enough to present network effects leading to
natural monopoly. It may simply be that the capital cost of a cell phone site is so
great that no one can make money unless he has hundreds of thousands of customers
to support that site. Or, it may not be profitable to deploy DSL or fiber to the curb
in a market for telephone services unless a sufficient subscriber base exists to
provide a return on the substantial investment. Network effects also operate with
respect to any one-stop shopping facility, such as iTunes, Amazon, or Netflix.
In these circumstances, the owner of the capital-intensive resource—or a
potential investor in a new such resource—has an incentive to exclude people who
do not pay. It has a concomitant incentive not to allow its competitors to get a free
ride on its investment to offer competing services at prices lower than the owner
must charge to recoup its investment. It is this set of circumstances that gives rise
to the most ferocious legal battles over how the Internet should be regulated—the
battle over competitive access to telephone infrastructure and, more recently, the
battle over net neutrality.281
Three basic kinds of access denials occur. The first two are vertical. The third
is horizontal. In one type of vertical denial of access, a firm with substantial market
share refuses to deal with an upstream supplier because it already has arrangements
279

Wilko Bolt & David Humphrey, Public Good Issues in Target: Natural Monopoly,
Scale Economies, Network Effects and Cost Allocation 6–7 (European Central Bank,
Working Paper No. 505, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=750785.
280
See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(expressing doubt whether traditional antitrust monopolization doctrines are appropriate “in
technologically dynamic markets characterized by network effects”).
281
Zack Christenson, Some Think It Is OK for the Government to Do what Net Neutrality
Would Prevent Others from Doing, THE AMERICAN CONSUMER INSTITUTE (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://www.theamericanconsumer.org/2011/03/01/cfa.
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with a preferred upstream supplier. An example might be a refusal by AT&T to sell
cell phones made by someone other than Apple. In another type of vertical denial
of access, a firm with substantial market share refuses to sell to customers competing with preferred customers. One example is a manufacturer that refuses to sell its
product to discount retailers. Another is Apple’s refusal to sell iPhones that work on
any network other than AT&T’s. In the horizontal context, a firm with substantial
market share refuses to cooperate (for example, by interconnecting with a competitor—usually a new entrant that threatens to take away market share).
Concern is growing that concentration in the telecommunications market may
eviscerate the Internet’s potential to provide an infrastructure in which competition
can flourish. The FCC has generally allowed concentration to increase through
major telephone-firm mergers, arguing that new technologies and intermodal
competition will preserve competitor opportunities and consumer choices. The FCC
approved two major mergers of local exchange carrier networks with long-distance
networks: the merger of Verizon and MCI,282 and the merger of SBC and AT&T.283
In March 2007, the district court approved the consent decrees recommended by the
Justice Department in the SBC/AT&T and Verizon/MCI mergers.284
Concentration in the cable industry, like concentration in the telephone industry,
is intensifying. In July 2006, the FCC approved transfer of Adelphia Communications Corporation’s assets to Time Warner and Comcast.285 The FCC accepted the
argument that the consolidation might result in reduced competition in the market
for programming, and adopted a condition that would allow programmers seeking
to use commercial leased access to submit disputes about the terms of access to
commercial arbitration.286 It also found that the possibility of uniform price increases
could reduce competition.287 The FCC also adopted commercial arbitration as a
condition to mitigate that risk288 and imposed detailed provisions for any arbitration
proceedings in an appendix to its decision.289
Empires are emerging that control backbone connectivity, but that is not all.
Empires are also developing with respect to content distribution. Whether these
empires pose threats to the Internet’s constitution depends on imperial business
policies. One can speculate on adverse directions for evolution. For example,
Google dominates the market for Internet search and for search-related advertising.
Its email service, Gmail, represents a rapidly growing share of the market.290 Its
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290

Verizon Commc’ns Inc. and MCI, Inc., 20 FCC Rcd. 18433 (2005).
SBC Commc’ns Inc. and AT&T Corp., 20 FCC Rcd. 18290 (2005).
United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2007).
Adelphia Commc’n Corp., 21 FCC Rcd. 8203, 8332 (2006).
Id. at 8253–54.
Id. at 8273.
Id. at 8274.
Id. at app. B.
Erick Schonfeld, Gmail Grew 43 Percent Last Year. AOL Mail and Hotmail Need to
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Android software for smart phones has displaced Apple’s dominance of this
market.291 Google has also entered the hardware market. It has launched Google+,
a social networking service aimed at Facebook’s market.292 Suppose Google makes
a business decision to discourage competition in these markets. It could make it
difficult for users of Android software to connect to e-mail services other than
Gmail. It could provide display and search-order preferences to advertisers who
book advertising directly with Google rather than with competing ad agencies. It
could make it easy for Google Plus members to find new friends through their Gmail
accounts, while making it more difficult for Facebook members to do the same. The
result would be a market structure in which Internet users obtain a larger and larger
portion of their Cyberspace resources through Google rather than its competitors.
As another example, take Amazon. It is the largest e-commerce vendor.293 To
date, Amazon has been aggressive in opening up access to competing suppliers of
books and entertainment products and merchandise.294 When one searches for a
particular type of merchandise, Amazon routinely provides links to several suppliers, including itself.295 It makes it easy to download Kindle books to other display
devices. It facilitates access to small, independent authors and publishers of conventional books and their e-book counterparts. But suppose Amazon changed its
business model. It could make it more difficult for consumers to find competitive
sellers of books, video, audio entertainment or the immense variety of other goods
that Amazon sells. It could eliminate the possibility of downloading Kindle books
to devices other than the Kindle itself. Similar possibilities exist for the handful of
large ISPs such as AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast to violate net neutrality, as considered in section B.
Proprietary empires also enlarge risks of political discrimination beyond the
reach of the rule of law.296 If the development of cloud computing induces a signifi
Start Worrying, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 14, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/01/14/gmail
-grew-43-percent-last-year-aol-mail-and-hotmail-need-to-start-worrying/.
291
Jay Yarow, Android Blows Past Apple to Take the Lead in Market Share for App
Downloads, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-10
-24/tech/30315528_1_android-apps-ios-smartphone.
292
Susan Mayes Ostrander, Google Plus vs. Facebook: Who’s Winning?, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/google-vs
-facebook_n_972080.html.
293
Eric Schonfeld, How Amazon Controls Ecommerce (Slides), TECHCRUNCH (May 11,
2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/05/11/how-amazon-controls-ecommerce-slides/
(estimating Amazon controls one-third of e-commerce).
294
See Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, Suddenly Amazon Starts Competing with Its Biggest
Suppliers, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 30, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-05
-11/tech/30022890_1_amazon-s-kindle-amazon-publishers.
295
See AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com.
296
See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the
Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (2001) (discussing private and public, or “hybrid
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cant fraction of individual and institutional users to use the cloud to store their
documents and other electronic assets, this will have three major effects: (1) It will
increase the vulnerability of Internet users to attacks on major repositories of data;
(2) It will make it easier for empires to gain new territory and make it more costly
for users to move from one empire to another;297 and (3) It will make it easier for
governments and private institutions to eavesdrop on individual Internet activity. No
longer will an eavesdropper have to gain access to data stored on a particular,
individually owned device; all that will be necessary is to gain access to a particular
empire in the cloud.298 It may make it easier to censor unpopular content.299
B. Discrimination and Net Neutrality
The rise of proprietary empires in the Internet—more concretely, consolidation
in the telephone and cable industries—is fueling debate in Congress and before the
FCC on “net neutrality”: the fear that providers of basic infrastructure will design
or program their facilities to give preferential treatment to certain suppliers or
customers.300
The growth of major bottlenecks in the Internet, represented by large ISPs and
connection services such as AT&T and Compuserve present the threat of
censorship.301 ISPs are under pressure to block services likely to facilitate access to
content infringing copyright302 and to expel infringing users,303 YouTube is threatregulation”); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town-Hall Democracy or
Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413 (1997) (discussing the relationship
between the Internet and regulation).
297
See generally Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761 (2011) (arguing
that the FCC should alter its philosophy based on the separation between telecommunications
and computing and assure access to cloud computing utilities); id. at 1819 (arguing that
“utility regulation should be the starting point for public policy discussions” of cloud
computing).
298
Id. at 1819–20 (discussing the need for restrictions on government access to content
stored in the cloud).
299
Id. at 1820–21 (discussing danger of censorship imposed through the cloud).
300
See Josh Peterson, FCC Net Neutrality Rules Take Effect, Experts Doubt Longevity,
THE DAILY CALLER (Nov. 21, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/11/21/fcc-net-neutrality
-rules-take-effect-experts-doubt-longeivty/.
301
See generally Dawn C. Nunziato, The First Amendment Issue of Our Time, 29 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1 (2010) (assessing the net neutrality debate in the context of
political speech that might be suppressed by ISPs).
302
See Fred von Lohmann, FCC Rules Against Comcast for BitTorrent Blocking,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 3, 2008), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/08
/fcc-rules-against-comcast-bit-torrent-blocking (describing Comcast’s blocking of BitTorrent
traffic and FCC reaction).
303
See David Kravets, Top Internet Providers Cool to RIAA 3-Strikes Plan, WIRED (Jan.
5, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/draft-verizon-o/.
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ened with liability for not being more active in detecting and removing allegedly
infringing video posts,304 and Craigslist is being pressured to remove its “adult
services” section.305
These developments not only threaten the fundamental architecture of the
Internet, making the establishment of empires more likely, as considered in subsection A, but they also increase the possibility of pressure to discriminate against
particular groups or points of view, such as gay rights advocates or Muslims.
The debate on net neutrality implicates technological, economic, and regulatory
issues.
The technological concern arises from the way Internet routers work. A router
is a specialized computer that knows how to read the headers of Internet packets and
to handle the packets according to the Internet address of the destination and the
Internet address of the origin. A router accepts a flow of Internet packets at its input
port—a wire pair, coaxial cable, or optical fiber, any of which might be connected
to a wireless channel—strips off the information comprising the “envelope” prescribed by the network communications protocol such as Ethernet, frame relay, or
asynchronous transfer mode, and examines the destination address of the Internet
packet inside. It then consults a routing table maintained in an active memory inside
the router and, based on the entry in the routing table corresponding to the destination address, sends that Internet packet to one of two or more output ports. Each
output port on a router is connected to another router, perhaps hundreds or thousands of miles away. The routing tables are periodically updated through specialized
messages that move through the Internet that normally are invisible to users of the
Internet.
Internet packets move from origin to destination through a series of routers.
These moves typically are called “hops.” Functionally, the Internet thus can be
represented as a logical tree in which each router represents a node at which two or
more choices are available as to the path a packet follows to the next node. In
theory, an arbitrarily large and complex network can be constructed from a binary
tree, signifying that each router has only two output ports. In practice, routers
handling substantial amounts of traffic have more than two output ports.
The links in such a tree represent the communications channels connecting the
routers. As explained in Part I.A.6, the Internet is indifferent as to the physical,
propagation, or modulation techniques used to carry Internet traffic. Accordingly,
one link may be a dial-up telephone line, another link may be a hard-wired wire pair,
another link may be an optical fiber capable of moving gigabits per second.
304

See infra Part I.E.2.c (discussing Viacom case).
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The decision that each router makes with respect to each Internet packet is
roughly analogous to the decision that an airline passenger makes in advance with
respect to changing planes at a hub airport. Usually, more than one route is available
from a particular origin to a particular destination, just as more than one airline route
typically is available from one airport to a destination airport. The passenger arrives
on one flight at a particular gate—representing an input port—and may leave on any
one of several flights departing from other gates, representing output ports. Hub
airports, of course, unlike Internet routers, have dozens or hundreds of input ports
(gates) and dozens or hundreds of output ports (gates). Moreover, the route followed
by an airline traveler, unlike the route followed by an Internet packet, is determined
in advance through the reservation and ticketing processes. Nevertheless, there are
decisions made at airports that resemble decisions made in routers. An airline
passenger ticket for a flight involving changes of planes specifies the input flight,
and the airline dispatch operation determines the input port (gate) at which that
flight arrives. The passenger ticket only defines the departure flight; it does not
define the gate. The passenger, much like the router, must consult a display board
or an airline representative, to determine which output port (gate) corresponds to the
departure flight number. That corresponds to a router looking up the appropriate
output port corresponding to a destination address in its routing table.
Multiple strategies exist for routing packets over the Internet. For example,
computer scientists and designers of Internet traffic patterns sometimes deploy
routing strategies that involve the fewest hops. Other times, they employ strategies
that select the path through the Internet with the highest bandwidth. Routing strategies also can be chosen based on economic decisions.306 These choices are reflected
in the routing tables of the routers at particular points in the Internet which have
routing tables appropriate to implement the strategy.
The economic incentives are strong for providers of high- bandwidth IP services
in a duopolistic market to discriminate in favor of their own offerings or to strike
deals with independent suppliers that give them traffic handling preferences.307
The result may not be transparent to consumers. Consumers will pay more
money for higher bandwidth connections in their homes and offices, but they will
not be forced to pay surcharges for access to disfavored services. Instead the
providers of the disfavored services will have to pay more for their connectivity.
Because some will not pay, consumers will see worse performance from the
disfavored services.308 If things evolve this way, it will be difficult to organize a
political coalition to force net neutrality obligations into law.
Many advocates of the Internet’s potential to form the basic national infrastructure for communications, information dissemination, and entertainment are con306
307
308
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cerned about the adverse effects of growing concentration in the provision of
Internet connectivity. This concern has been focused through a public debate on “net
neutrality.” To understand the net neutrality debate, which constitutes the major
current public policy debate pitting communications service providers against
Internet users, one can benefit from a review of two basic realities, the first dealing
with technology and the second dealing with economics.
No one owns the entire Internet. Instead the Internet is a collection of concepts,
technical protocols and format standards that permit thousands—indeed millions—of owners of communications channels and routers to exchange traffic with
each other. Because Internet user preference functions and wealth differ, some users
are willing to pay more to use the Internet than others. The owners of the hardware
and computer programs comprising the routers and communications links thus have
an incentive to engage in price discrimination—to charge what the traffic will bear.
The owner of Internet assets can determine the identity of senders and recipients of
Internet traffic based on the origin and destination addresses of the Internet packets
moving through their assets. They could therefore, if they wish, set up their routing
tables according to the revenue likely to be obtainable from particular users.
The entrepreneur can program his routers to reject low-priced traffic. For
example, it can program its router exchanging traffic with end users so that traffic
destined for a high-priced provider is routed to the high-capacity communication
link connected to a particular output port, while all other traffic is routed to another
output port connected to a lower-capacity line. It can program its other router,
located further inside the cloud, similarly to route only those packets to or from
high-priced subscribers to high-capacity links and to route all others to lowercapacity links. The result is that users, whether they be consumers or providers, get
better Internet connectivity if they pay more money, while those paying less money
get worse Internet connectivity. The same techniques can be used to discriminate
against competitors as well as to discriminate based on the price. For example, the
owner of a router may set up the routing tables so that packets addressed to a
competing service provider—say a provider of VoIP services—simply are thrown
away while packets addressed to the owner’s own VoIP service are passed along to
a high-capacity connection carrying that provider’s VoIP traffic. Because the router
throws away packets addressed to the competitor, the end user experiences an
inability to connect to any VoIP provider except that provided by the owner of the
router.309
This is exactly what Madison River Communications LLC did. Madison River
is an independent provider of telecommunications services to home subscribers,
among others, in North Carolina. It programmed its equipment, presumably routers
connected to DSL subscriber lines, to block traffic destined for certain VoIP
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traffic.310 It is not entirely clear from the official record made public whether
Madison River blocked all VoIP packets or only those intended for VoIP providers
competing with Madison’s own VoIP service.311 In any event, the FCC notified
Madison that it was investigating complaints about its blocking practices and in
March 2005, entered into a consent decree, fining Madison River $15,000 and
barring it for thirty months from “block[ing] ports used for VOIP applications or
otherwise prevent[ing] customers from using VOIP applications.”312 It does not
matter whether Madison River was programming its routers to throw away all VoIP
traffic or only VoIP traffic not addressed to its own VoIP servers; the point is that
it was using the Internet’s capacity to discriminate against disfavored traffic.313
Alarmed by risk of such discrimination developments, commercial entities,
including independent VoIP providers and large-volume information enterprises
such as Google and Yahoo!, urged the U.S. Congress to enact new legislation that
would ensure net neutrality. Net neutrality would disallow discrimination among
consumers and providers of Internet traffic, although it would allow pricing based
on the bandwidth of connections—at least price variations for bandwidth provided
consumers.314 The House of Representatives responded to their concerns. HR
5417315 would have amended the Clayton Act316 to add a section prohibiting any
broadband network provider from offering its network services on discriminatory
terms and conditions, from refusing to interconnect its facilities with the facilities
of other providers of broadband network services, from blocking traffic associated
with any lawful content applications or services over the Internet, from charging
fees to avoid discrimination or blocking, and from excluding hardware that does not
physically damage or materially degrade other utilization of the network.317 Hearings
were held by both House and Senate committees considering this and similar
legislation.318
Consumer groups testified in favor of the legislation, in part because it would
ensure the availability of competing providers of broadband video services.319
310
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Opponents of the legislation argued that it was premature and inconsistent with the
successful hands-off approach to Internet regulation that had led to massive innovation and investment in the Internet.320 While some of these opponents were willing
to accept legislation requiring studies of net neutrality, or relatively mild provisions,
they opposed stronger provisions advocated by those most concerned about net
neutrality.321 They argued, however, that going beyond those basic investigations or
principles represented “an effort to safeguard against a problem that, at this point
and in the foreseeable future, is nonexistent.”322 Others argued that the FCC’s
existing Internet principles, which the Commission had incorporated into merger
approvals,323 combined with market forces, adequately addressed the problem.324
They argued that more prescriptive legislation would discourage investment in
widening the lanes on the Internet highway to avoid traffic jams, which required
investment, which in turn, required expectations of an adequate rate of return.325
The bill reported by the Senate Commerce Committee did
not include proposed amendments to strengthen net neutrality
provisions. Chairman Ted Stevens said, “We still have a massive
disagreement over net neutrality. I still remain convinced that
net neutrality is not something that we can define. We haven’t
seen it anywhere here or in the world so far and that the World
Wide Web is still open [sic].”326 The House, on the other hand
reported H.R. 5417, with stronger net neutrality provisions.327
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In the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge
Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications,328
involved a challenge to Comcast’s practice of throttling peer-to-peer traffic, specifically BitTorrent, used by its subscribers to share files. On the merits, the FCC found:
The record leaves no doubt that Comcast’s network management
practices discriminate among applications and protocols rather
than treating all equally. . . . Comcast has deployed equipment
across its networks that monitors its customers’ TCP connections using deep packet inspection to determine how many
connections are peer-to-peer uploads. When Comcast judges that
there are too many peer-to-peer uploads in a given area,
Comcast’s equipment terminates some of those connections by
sending RST packets. In other words, Comcast determines how
it will route some connections based not on their destinations but
on their contents; in laymen’s terms, Comcast opens its customers’ mail because it wants to deliver mail not based on the address or type of stamp on the envelope but on the type of letter
contained therein. Furthermore, Comcast’s interruption of customers’ uploads by definition interferes with Internet users’
downloads since “any end-point that is uploading has a corresponding end-point that is downloading.” Also, because
Comcast’s method, sending RST packets to both sides of a TCP
connection, is the same method computers connected via TCP
use to communicate with each other, a customer has no way of
knowing when Comcast (rather than its peer) terminates a connection.329
The FCC found that these practices were not narrowly tailored to easing network congestion and that Comcast had other, non-discriminatory, methods for
managing network congestion.330
Because Comcast did not establish that the challenged procedures were reasonable network management practices,
Comcast’s interference with peer-to-peer protocols . . .
contravene[s] the federal policy of “promot[ing] the continued
development of the Internet” because that interference impedes
328
329
330
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consumers from “run[ning] applications . . . of their choice,”
rather than those favored by Comcast, and that interference
limits consumers’ ability to “access the lawful Internet content
of their choice,” including the video programming made available by vendors like Vuze. Comcast’s selective interference also
appears to discourage the “development of technologies”—such
as peer-to-peer technologies—that “maximize user control over
what information is received by individuals . . . who use the
Internet” because that interference (again) impedes consumers
from “run[ning] applications . . . of their choice,” rather than
those favored by Comcast.331
The Commission responded to Comcast’s challenge “that the Commission
cannot exercise jurisdiction over its interference with peer-to-peer TCP connections
. . . because such authority must be ‘ancillary to something, but here it is not clear
what that something might be’”332 by pointing to Sections 1 (goal of making communications service available), 201 (common carrier practices must be just and
reasonable), 706 (deployment of advanced telecommunications services), 256
(promotion of non-discriminatory access to public telecommunications networks),
257 (elimination of market-entry barriers for entrepreneurs and small businesses),
and 601 (assuring that cable providers offer widest possible diversity of services) of
the Telecommunications Act.333
In Comcast Corp. v. FCC,334 the D.C. circuit court invalidated the FCC’s
Comcast order. Noting that the FCC had found “that cable Internet service is neither
a ‘telecommunications service’ covered by Title II of the Communications Act nor
a ‘cable service’ covered by Title VI,”335 the court found that the Commission lacked
ancillary authority under section 4(i) of the Act.336 Applying its established two-part
test—that ancillary jurisdiction exists only when: “‘(1) the Commission’s general
jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the Communications Act] covers the regulated
subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities,’”337—it found that
“[b]ecause the Commission has failed to tie its assertion of ancillary authority over
331
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Comcast’s Internet service to any ‘statutorily mandated responsibility,’” the order
was invalid.338
The court rejected the FCC’s argument that the Supreme Court had recognized
its authority to “‘require cable companies to allow independent ISPs access to their
facilities’ pursuant to its ancillary authority, rather than using Title II.”339 It found
that “policy statements alone” cannot satisfy the requirement for a statutory mandate
to serve as the foundation for “ancillary jurisdiction.”340 It rejected the FCC’s
argument that it had authority over broadband under section 706341 and under section
257.342
In late 2010, the Commission responded to the D.C. Circuit by revising its Net
Neutrality rules prohibiting broadband Internet access providers from discriminating
against or blocking traffic.343 It addressed the court of appeals’ ruling that it lacked
jurisdiction, by reiterating its authority under section 706 of the Act,344 its authority
to promote competition and investment in, and to protect end users of, voice, video,
and audio services,345 its responsibilities under Title II to regulate VoIP services,346
its authority under Titles III and VI of the Act to promote orderly development of
local television broadcasting and MVPD programming,347 and its authority to protect
the public interest through spectrum licensing.348
Verizon and others petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review and sought assignment
of the case to the same panel that ruled against the earlier FCC Net Neutrality order.
The court of appeals denied the panel-assignment request on February 2, 2011.349
The FCC also could have responded to the D.C. Circuit’s decision by reclassifying Internet access as common-carriage—one of the regulatory options identified as
the National Broadband Plan.350 If the Commission were to take that approach, it
would have to reverse its earlier decisions that Internet access over cable and
telephone lines does not constitute “telecommunications” service. Administrative
agencies are entitled to change earlier decisions, but they must justify such changes
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in policy consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act’s prohibition of arbitrary
and capricious decision making.351
C. Eclipse of the Public Domain for Knowledge and Art
The Internet has made it possible for artists of all kinds to reach a global
population of potential audiences by reducing barriers to entry.352 The frontier of
innovation involves developing business models for intermediaries, and mitigating
transaction costs for licensing pre-existing content. As Larry Lessig has observed,
however, “just as a free market is perverted if its property becomes feudal, so too
can a free culture be queered by extremism in the property rights that define it.”353
It was clear at the time of the Harvard conference that the growth of the Internet
as a backbone for commerce, social interaction, and politics would involve the
emergence of new intermediaries.354 Twenty years later, the Internet revolution is
manifested as much by new rapidly growing Internet intermediaries who are supplanting the role of established institutions: Amazon at the expense of Borders,
iTunes at the expense of Tower Records, NetFlix at the expense of Blockbuster.
This part of the revolution continues and it is uncertain which new intermediation
ideas will prove to be the “next big thing,” and which brick and mortar establishments will fall victim.355
As this disruptive change in intermediation continues, the threatened enterprises
are employing a variety of measures to thwart the emergence of new Internet-based
intermediaries. As Larry Lessig said, “an environment designed to enable the new
is being transformed to protect the old.”356 Copyright enforcement is increasingly
taking the form of closing off access.
351
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The technology-driven revolution in the popular music industry is a good
example of the threat.357 The major labels will not survive in anything like their
previous form. CDs are dead as a distribution medium. Barriers to entry have
declined dramatically as the costs of producing top-quality recordings have dropped
by a couple of orders of magnitude. Portable music players such as smartphones
permit consumers to listen to music all the time and this enormously increases the
potential demand for music.
“The increased competition and the demise of traditional gatekeepers signal a
sharp reduction in prices—approaching zero—for recorded music.”358 Prices for
recorded music approaching zero also means that copyright is becoming irrelevant
except at the margins of the “new order.”359 “As prices for recorded music decline
. . . toward zero [with costs] . . . [t]he costs of copyright enforcement exceed the
benefits.”360 The result is nearly one in which no one is willing to pay (much) for
recorded music.361 “Technology makes it impossible to enforce copyright, but it does
not matter, because no one would pay for music from either the originator or a
pirate. A pirate cannot construct a viable business model.”362
Increased supply and demand result in higher search costs. Musicians and their
potential fans must be able to find each other. Someone has to perform the matchmaking function formerly performed by the major labels and the radio station
chains. Innovation and experimentation will increase as new kinds of intermediaries
seek the best way to connect musicians with their potential fans. A handful of these
will become the dominant gatekeepers.363
The emerging intermediaries, necessary to perform the matchmaking function,
will not work for free.364 Even if a business model is unnecessary for the musicians
themselves, it is necessary for the intermediaries.365 Unless such a business model
emerges the new music marketplace will be one in which hundreds of thousands of
artists making very good music go essentially unnoticed by those who would enjoy
their music.366 For viable business models to exist, entrepreneurs must creatively
monetize access to the celebrity, and also develop technologies for classifying music
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to reduce consumer search costs.367 Monetization will rely less on copyright and
more on behaviorally targeted advertising and social networking.
“As with popular music, new technologies of video entertainment have opened
the gates to the marketplace for independent (“indie”) artists and producers, eroding
the control of traditional gatekeepers.”368 “[T]echnology is causing the collapse of
boundaries separating movies, television, the Internet, and video games—the
traditionally separate categories of video entertainment.”369
Digital technologies are now gradually dominating movie making, replacing
film. Production activities that used to be defined by a medium or channel of
distribution now easily cover several.370 “The melding of these traditionally separate
categories requires rethinking the economics, business strategies, and legal frameworks that shape video entertainment.”371
Collapsing boundaries and reduced barriers to entry are leading to a more
efficient and competitive industry, with a wider variety of choices for consumers.
Large capital costs for production, inherent in the full-motion video form, can be
spread over more product lines. Migration of artists and technologists from one
industry category into others will shake up old ways of doing things and reduce
capital requirements.372
Serialization373 can mitigate the capital costs of video production, as
moviemakers build a fan base and a pool of potential investors with an initial,
relatively low cost pilot episode, building a revenue stream over time by offering
future episodes. When serialization grows, the economic value of the creative effort
inheres more in the characters than in the specific details of a single episode. The
copyright battleground will shift to protection of characters and basic story features.
The law will allocate freedom to build new video narratives on what has gone before
between third parties, such as fan fiction writers, and the creators of the originals.374
Crowd sourcing can also draw potential to draw in larger numbers of collaborators to the creative, production, distribution, marketing, and financing activities. As
the scope of collaboration increases, the law of joint authorship becomes more
important. Larger creative teams will put stress on default rules for apportioning
ownership of intellectual property.375
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In such market, however, new entrants must obtain licenses to copyrighted
music, characters, storylines, or scenes that they incorporate into new movies. This
will increase the already-daunting transaction costs for licensing rights.376
New public and private law mechanisms are needed to make the market function
more efficiently, by making it easier for creators of new works to (1) find the owners
of preexisting content and (2) overcome other barriers to obtaining licenses, such as
strategic behavior, irrational protection of entrenched bureaucracies, and obsolete,
embedded capital.377
As the technology-driven revolution continues in the entertainment industry, one
of the most dangerous threats to the sustainability of the Internet’s open character
arises: overreaching by owners of intellectual property—particularly ownership of
copyright in entertainment works.378 Rights holders use civil subpoenas to obtain
private information about network users and then file lawsuits by the tens of thousands. They pressure ISPs to discriminate among users of their connection services.
That pressure is what triggered the Net Neutrality debate. They hire contractors to
extort settlements by those they accuse of infringement. Copyright law threatens the
healthy evolution of the Internet because of expansion of copyright monopolies,
abuse of civil litigation, and legislative capture.379
1. Expansion of Copyright Monopolies
Expansion of protection for rights holders and diminished scope for traditional
privileges, such as that available under Fair Use, stifles creative innovation because
it makes it easier for established enterprises with an IP portfolio to discourage or
block new creative effort that competes with existing works. Two instances of such
expansion involve extending copyright to protect characters and plots, and extension
of the term of the copyright monopoly.
One area of expansion extends copyright protection to plots and characters.
Protection of characters and the derivative work right have been explored in recent
litigation involving fan fiction.380 Two recent cases involving fan fiction used Judge
376
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Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261 (1996) (arguing that product design can protect
against free riding better than copyright law).
380
Perritt, supra note 376, at 15. “‘Fan fiction’ refers to a phenomenon in which persons
other than the author of a work write their own stories about characters created by the
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Hand’s abstractions test to afford copyright protection to fictional characters; one
involved Holden Caulfield from Catcher in the Rye, while the second involved
Harry Potter.381 “In Salinger v. Colting,382 the district court granted a preliminary
injunction barring publication of an unauthorized sequel to Catcher in the Rye,
finding probability of success on [a] prima-face copyright infringement [claim] and
unlikelihood of success on a fair use defense.”383 The court concluded that the
Holden Caulfield character was “distinctively delineated” in Catcher in the Rye and
therefore qualified for copyright protection.384
The second fan fiction case, Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books,385
involved a claim of copyright infringement by J.K. Rowling, the author of the Harry
Potter series, against the developers and publishers of a “Harry Potter Lexicon,”
which provided supplementary information on the characters and events in the
Harry Potter books.386 The district court found that the Lexicon contained “direct
quotations or paraphrases, plot details, or summaries of scenes from one or more of
the Harry Potter novels.”387 The defendant copied fictional facts invented by
Rowling, “such as the attributes of imaginary creatures and objects, the traits and

original author, usually making no pretense that the characters are different. Fan fiction is
an exploding genre, fueled by the ease with which new works by unknown authors can be
disseminated on the Internet. ‘Mary Sue fiction’ creates stories in which minor characters
from earlier works star in new works or in which entirely new characters are inserted. ‘Slash
fiction’ takes male characters from earlier works and puts them in gay contexts. ‘Real person
slash fiction’ takes real people and puts them in stories involving gay relationships or
encounters.” Perritt, supra note 56, at 179. See William W. Fisher, III, The Implications for
Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1420–1421 (2010) (describing the
phenomenon of fan fiction and suggesting several different varieties). See also Anupam
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue”
Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 598–601 (2007); Sonia K. Katyal,
Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 481–97 (2006); Aaron Schwabach, The Harry Potter Lexicon and the
World of Fandom: Fan Fiction, Outsider Works, and Copyright, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 387,
388–91 (2009); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New
Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 655 (1997).
381
Salinger v. Cotting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc.
v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) Perritt, supra note 56, at 179 n. 298.
382
641 F. Supp. 2d at 250, vacated, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that district
court erroneously presumed irreparable injury in granting preliminary injunction under eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
383
Perritt, supra note 376, at 15.
384
641 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (2009)) (explaining the standard for protection of fictional characters).
385
575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
386
Id. at 517, 519–20.
387
Id. at 535.
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undertakings of major and minor characters, and the events surrounding them.”388
“[S]uch invented facts constitute[d] creative expression protected by copyright,”
according to the court.389
Another defacto expansion of copyright is exemplified by the rise in right-ofpublicity claims under state law.390 Many such claims should be found to be preempted by the federal Copyright Act.391
The Copyright Extension Act was another example of an effort by established
rights holders to extend their monopolies. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,392 Justice Stevens’s
dissent criticized the abandonment by the Court of its responsibility to protect the
public interest in free access to the products of artistic genius.393 Justice Breyer’s
dissent characterized the extension as making the copyright term virtually perpetual,
in violation of the constitutional requirement that it be limited, and that granting the
extended term to “heirs, estates, and corporate successors” of authors vitiated the
constitutionally required purpose of promoting “Science”—indeed it inhibited the
progress of science by interposing obstacles to access to copyrighted works.394
2. Abuse of Civil Litigation Process
As new technologies have stressed traditional business models, aggressive
litigation by traditional rights-holders has materialized, as evidenced by analysis
throughout this Part. The enforcement methods used by rights-holders threatens core
Internet characteristics when rights-holders mobilize legal or economic pressure on
intermediaries such as ISPs to block traffic that facilitates infringing activities—as
defined by rights-holders, who naturally take an expensive view of what constitutes
infringement of copyright,395 and through their litigation strategies.
I have been an occasional participant in the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s
efforts to block abuse of civil process.396 The RIAA’s litigation typically proceeded
388

Id. at 536.
Id.
390
See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss professional football player’s right-ofpublicity claim against video game producer).
391
See Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1154–55 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding that the actor’s right-of-publicity claim against unlicensed distribution of his
performances was preempted).
392
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
393
Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
394
Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
395
See supra Part III.B (discussing net neutrality).
396
See, e.g., Facebook Plaintiffs Seek to Consolidate Tracking Cookie Cases in
California, PRNEWSWIRE (Oct. 17, 2011), http://prnewswire.com/news-releases/facebook
-plaintiffs-seek-to-consolidate-tracking-cookie-cases-in-california-retain-professor-of-law
-and-former-dean-of-chicago-kent-college-of-law-henry-h-perritt-as-expert-advisor
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like this: The RIAA would serve basketfuls of subpoenas on ISPs, demanding
personally identifying information for individuals linked to IP addresses that the
RIAA believed to be involved in exchanging unlicensed music files. Once it obtained the information, it transferred it to contractors who would send demand letters
threatening litigation and emphasizing statutory damages running into the hundreds
of thousands or millions of dollars. The contractor then would offer to settle for
what it estimated was in the target’s bank account. Most recipients, frightened,
settled.397 This organized extortion has mostly survived challenges, although
grudgingly, the courts are placing limitations on it. In Lahiri v. Universal Music and
Video Distribution Corp.,398 the court of appeals affirmed an award of $247,397.28
in attorneys’ fees and $10,808.76 in costs, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, against an
attorney who represented an individual who maintained frivolous copyright infringement actions.399
In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Foster,400 the district court awarded attorneys’ fees
to a defendant who had been sued for alleged infringement of musical works owned
by the plaintiff occurring through her Internet account.401 The court found that:
The plaintiffs failed to allege any facts in their complaint that
would support Ms. Foster’s secondary copyright infringement
liability. The complaint is devoid of any suggestion that Ms.
Foster knew third parties were using her account to infringe the
plaintiffs’ copyrights or that she substantially participated in any
infringing activities. Also absent from the complaint is any
allegation that Ms. Foster profited from a direct infringement.
Additionally, neither the parties’ submissions nor the Court’s
own research has revealed any case holding the mere owner of
an Internet account contributorily or vicariously liable for the
infringing activities of third persons.402
Moreover, the court questioned the good faith of the plaintiffs, finding that it
appeared that the “plaintiffs initiated the secondary infringement claims to press Ms.
Foster into settlement after they had ceased to believe that she was [the] direct or
‘primary’ infringer.”403 The evidence indicated that the defendant’s estranged
-132013918.html.
397
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Music Markets and Mythologies, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 831, 833 (2010).
398
606 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2010).
399
Id. at 1218, 1223.
400
No. Civ. 04-1569-W , 2007 WL 1028532 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 6, 2007).
401
Id. at *6.
402
Id. at *3.
403
Id. at *4.
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husband or her adult daughter may have been responsible for the alleged infringement.404
In a decision significant for a broad category of disputes over “theft” of protected signals or copyrighted content, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed dismissal of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
action against a satellite television broadcaster.405 Plaintiffs alleged that the broadcaster sent more than 100,000 letters to purchasers of satellite-signal decryption
equipment, threatening criminal prosecution and civil litigation unless the recipients
paid thousands of dollars to settle claims that they unlawfully intercepted and
viewed encrypted satellite television broadcasts.406 The suit claimed that the broadcasters made no attempt to discern whether recipients of the demand letters were
actually engaged in illegal conduct, and telephone calls by the recipients protesting
their innocence were rebuffed with renewed demands for payment of money to settle
the claims; therefore, the pattern of sending the letters constituted extortion because
they induced fear, made unsupportable factual allegations, and misstated the law,
thus constituting fraud.407
In Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services,
Inc.,408 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court. The
court avoided constitutional challenges to the DMCA subpoena provision409 and
held that section 512(h) of the statute did not authorize subpoenas compelling an ISP
to disclose information as to which the “ISP act[s] only as a conduit for data transferred between two internet users, such as persons sending and receiving e-mail or,
as in this case, sharing P2P files.”410
Another type of abuse of process by rights-holders involves frivolous takedown
notices under the DMCA. Frivolous DMCA takedown notices can inflict serious
harm on persons denied access to e-commerce as a result.411 The DMCA provides
a remedy for such notices.412
In Design Furnishings, Inc. v. Zen Path, LLC,413 the district court preliminarily
enjoined a furniture designer from submitting DMCA takedown notices to eBay.
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s outdoor patio furniture infringed on her
404

Id. at *1.
Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2006) (involving claims under RICO,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968).
406
Id. at 925–26, 942.
407
Id. at 939–40 (characterizing claims by plaintiffs).
408
351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
409
17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006).
410
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 351 F.3d at 1233.
411
See Michael P. Murtagh, Note, The FCC, the DMCA, and Why Takedown Notices Are
Not Enough, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 253–57 (2009).
412
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (g)(3) (2006) (explaining the counter notification mechanism).
413
No. CIV 2:10-2765 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 5418893 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010).
405
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designs, although the Copyright Office had denied defendant’s copyright application.414 The court began with the proposition that:
The DMCA provides that “[a]ny person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section . . . that material or activity
is infringing . . . shall be liable for any damages . . . incurred by
the alleged infringer . . . who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider . . . removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing
. . . .”415
The court found that the defendant’s furniture was not likely entitled to copyright
protection, and found the “knowingly misrepresents” element satisfied by the
defendant’s failure to respond to the plaintiff’s demand that it prove its intellectual
property rights—three months before the defendant even applied for a copyright
registration.416
The Court found “irreparable harm,” although damages alone are usually
insufficient:
[T]he court concludes that, if defendant continues to submit
notices of copyright infringement to eBay, it is likely that eBay
would terminate listings, temporarily restrict plaintiff from
selling on one or both of its accounts, or suspend or terminate
plaintiff’s accounts. eBay’s responses to defendant’s notices
would likely deter prospective customers and adversely affect
plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill on a web site from which it
generates 95 percent of its revenues. Plaintiff’s accounts’ policy
violation ratings would also likely decrease if plaintiff continues
to sell the furniture and defendant continues to submit notices to
eBay. The decrease in the policy violation ratings would also
cause irreparable harm.417
3. Legislative Capture
The likelihood of effective legislative action to redress the balance between new
creativity and the property rights of past creators is small because of legislative
capture by the established interests who oppose innovation and competition. The
414
415
416
417

Id. at *2.
Id. at *4 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006)).
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *7 (citation omitted).
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legislative process leading up to enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act418 reflects one of the political realities of copyright policy making: when rights
holders were unable to persuade the United States Congress to enact their legislative
priorities, they went to international treaty organizations, drafted treaty language that
was adopted, and then returned to Congress, saying, in effect, “You have to enact
legislation; it’s the obligation of the United States under international law.”419 The
ensuing legislative process also provided an opportunity to amend copyright law in
other respects as well. The political power of Walt Disney Company, other movie
studios, and record labels makes any effort to reform copyright law legislatively
perilous.420
D. Behaviorally Targeted Advertising
Behaviorally targeted advertising offers advantages to both advertisers and
consumers. Advertisers need not pay high prices for undifferentiated access to large
numbers of potential customers through television, print, or billboard advertising.
Instead they can pay, often only if the target looks at (clicks on) the ad, for advertisements targeted narrowly to persons likely to have a propensity to purchase their
products.421 Consumers see only—or mostly—advertisements aligned with their
interests. Behaviorally targeted advertising is possible only by using large stores of
information about the Internet behavior of millions of consumers.
Electronic commerce is well established. Early concerns about payment systems, order fulfillment, and trust are but distant memories. Big e-commerce sites,
such as Amazon and eBay make it easy for small entrepreneurs to reach a global
customer base.422
E-commerce exhibits a wide variety of business models. Sellers of information
content have tried subscription models, similar to that used by cable television
services. Many others, such as portals providing indexing and pointers value, used

418

Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2861 (1998).
I participated in discussions in the Clinton White House about how to rein in Bruce
Lehman, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Commissioner of
Patents and Copyrights, who was perceived as pursuing expansion of copyright in
international negotiations.
420
See generally LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 356, at 11 (describing the
copyright wars as being about basic American values, necessitating a balance between
property interests and the opportunity for creators to build on the past).
421
See Perritt, supra note 397, at 852.
422
See, e.g., Selling on Amazon, AMAZON, http://www.amazonservices.com/content/sell
-on-amazon.htm?ld=AZFSSOA (explaining how to set up a presence on amazon.com) (last
visited on Jan. 13, 2012); eBay Seller Information Center, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com
/sellerinformation/ebayforbusiness/essentials.html (explaining how to set up a seller presence
on eBay) (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
419

2012]

THE INTERNET AT 20

63

an advertising model like that originally employed by newspapers and television and
radio broadcasting.423 Still others charge a fee for each sale, resembling the business
model long used by brokers. Both the advertising and the data-collection models
benefit from giving content away for free.424 They are thus the most interesting for
the future of e-commerce, in an environment in which consumers are accustomed
to access without payment, fueled by the large number of providers who are willing
to volunteer their services and give away the fruits of their services, as on most
blogs in many collaborative offerings such as Wikipedia.425
The technology of the Internet permits many of these business models to be
combined. For example, advertisements can be “clickable,” signifying that one may
not only read the advertisement but also click on the image of the advertisement and
automatically be connected to the advertiser’s web site. This possibility enables
those selling advertising to charge not only for ad placement, but also for user
clicks. Some e-mail services are free to consumers who agree to receive graphical
display ads with their email.426 Consumers also must agree to the release of personal
information that they supply with their subscription applications to the advertisers.
The central role of advertising in most business models has accelerated the use
of behaviorally targeted advertising. Providers of content and value-added features
can collect data about the behavior and interests of people who access their services,
and then sell that data. The value of such consumer transaction data is in helping
product suppliers and marketing personnel to target advertising and direct mail
solicitation through conventional media much more narrowly. It also benefits
consumers because they are more likely to get advertisements that they are interested in, much as occurs with Amazon’s and Netflix’s “recommendations.” Obviously, this opportunity for selling and using data raises major personal privacy
concerns.427 The controversy is likely to grow over private collection and use of
423

Robert Samuelson, The Five Business Models of E-Commerce, CLICKZ (Dec. 23,
1998), http://clickz.com/clickz/column/1718210/the-five-business-models-e-commerce.
424
See Chris Anderson, The Economics of Giving It Away, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123335678420235003.html.
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See Wikipleadia: The Promise and Perils of Crowdsourcing Content, ECONOMIST (Jan.
13, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/17911276.
426
See The Economics of Free: Nice But Tricky, ECONOMIST (July 16, 2009), http://www
.economist.com/node/14030161.
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See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Dierdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 283 (2011) (referring to the controversy over Doubleclick’s
plan to combine clickstream information with other consumer data); Samantha L. Millier,
Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet,
97 KY. L.J. 541, 545–47 (2009) (raising alarms about Facebook’s collection of data for
behaviorally targeted advertising); William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?:
Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195,
1220–21 (2010) (describing collection of personal data for use in targeted advertising;
suggesting the activity violated the Stored Communications Act).
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personal data, although the more significant threat is that the government will get
access to the information, if it is collected.
If the law impedes private-sector use of personal data for behaviorally targeted
advertising, it will discourage one of the most promising possibilities for providing
revenue to replace that lost by over-expansive definitions, or over-aggressive
enforcement, of intellectual property rights. On the other hand, the law should be
vigilant in blocking the government from spying on its citizens by easy access to the
store of personal data.
E. Cybersecurity
The Internet is a powerful tool for spying, and an appealing target for criminals,
vandals, and terrorists. How the law limits the tools and protects the targets will
have a powerful effect on the future of the Internet.
1. Police States, Cyberactivism and Embargos
The Internet makes it more difficult for totalitarian regimes to control their
populations, but it also makes it easier for them to spy on their populations. The
Arab Spring demonstrated that insurgents can use a variety of tools, many of them
depending on Internet connectivity, to communicate plans and coordinate activities
to circumvent governmental efforts to crush dissent.428 But it also demonstrated the
fallacy of the belief that the Internet cannot be shut down by the government. The
regimes in Egypt, Lybia, Iran, and Syria succeeded, when political crises bloomed,
in disabling Internet connectivity within their territories.429 As intelligence agencies
get more sophisticated, they can monitor Internet trails, providing better intelligence
on the activities of dissidents. Traffic analysis, even without access to communications content, can reveal the identity of leaders, their whereabouts, and their plans.
2. Power of Traffic Analysis
Transactional data about communications, not involving access to content, enjoy
a less protected position than content in the combinations of legal controls adopted
by Congress. Less protection for such data flows from the reasoning of the Smith

428

See William Saletan, Springtime for Twitter: Is the Internet Driving the Revolutions
of the Arab Spring?, SLATE (July 18, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future
_tense/2011/07/springtime_for_twitter.single.html.
429
See Ido Kenan, e-Sensorship and the Arab Spring, MA’ARAV EDITORIAL (Nov. 17,
2011), http://www.maarav.org.il/english/2011/11/e-sensorship-and-the-arab-spring.
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case430—that little expectation of privacy for such data exists because the data are
disclosed to and used by third-party service providers. Even if that proposition is
correct for dialed telephone numbers, it is not true for the inferences that may be
drawn from large quantities of data about patterns of communication available from
modern telecommunications networks. Traffic analysis of IP packets to and from a
particular target can reveal a blueprint of the target’s human associations. It can
reveal subject matter interests through analysis of web browsing. Analysis of
geographic information from cell phone connections can detail target movements,
minute by minute.431
Advances in technology facilitate such traffic analysis because they facilitate
acquisition of transactional data, as from IP packet headers, and they also facilitate
machine analysis of patterns revealed by the acquired data. In many cases, traffic
analysis may actually be more valuable to law enforcement and intelligence agencies
than the content of a handful of messages. Traffic analysis may also be more
revealing about the private conduct and thoughts of a target than content.
Suppose a criminal intelligence agency acquires information about every cell
phone call made or received by a target for a period of six months. Through relatively inexpensive and widely available techniques, the agency can collect information on the date and time of every call made or received and the other telephone
number to or from which a call is attempted or established. Call-duration data is also
available. By analyzing the patterns of cell phone communication by the target, the
monitoring agency could determine, for example, that the target communicates at
least daily with a suspected drug dealer and, regularly, on a weekly basis, with
another individual in the target’s hometown. From these data the agency could infer
that the target is himself a drug dealer, or at least a drug user, and also could infer
that the individual with whom the target communicates weekly is a good friend or,
possibly, someone with whom the target has a romantic involvement.
A foreign intelligence agency might obtain data on a target, which could reveal
that the target has regular communication with a particular telephone number in Iran
and places many calls to different individuals in a geographic area with a substantial
Muslim population. From these data the foreign intelligence agency might infer that
the target is involved in raising money for an activity directed from Iran, or that the
target is involved in organizing some form of collective activity related to Iran. At
the very least, these inferences might constitute sufficient probable cause to allow
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See PERRITT, supra note 72, at § 13.05[A] (analyzing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979)).
431
“Although acts performed in ‘public,’ especially if taken singly or in small numbers,
may not be confidential, at least arguably a right to privacy may nevertheless be invaded
through extensive or exhaustive monitoring and cataloguing of acts normally disconnected
and anonymous.” Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (N.Y. 1970) (Breitel,
J., concurring).
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the agency to obtain a judicial order for acquisition of the content of these communications.
The overall effect is analogous to physical surveillance of the target—following
the target everywhere and identifying all the people with whom the target communicates face to face.
A newer form of traffic analysis is potentially even more useful and even more
intrusive: monitoring a target’s web browsing. Information about every web address
(URL) visited by a target is readily collectible by intercepting IP traffic to and from
the target’s IP address under a Pen/Trap order, which does not require probable
cause.432 Alternatively, and at far less cost, a criminal intelligence or a foreign
intelligence agency can obtain much of the same kind of information by obtaining
records maintained by search engines, such as Yahoo! and Google, which would
reveal every web page a user/target searches for. Because most web browsing
involves regular resort to search engines to find the URL for web pages of interest,
data from search engines represent a substantial subset of web-browsing activity.
Analysis of this type of traffic not only reveals other people with whom a target
has communication, but is analogous to a type of physical surveillance—entirely
impracticable to effectuate—which would have someone looking over the target’s
shoulder as the target browses newspapers, magazines, or possible selections in a
bookstore. It is thus closer to revealing the target’s interests and thoughts, even if
the target never chooses to reveal these to anyone else.
Here lies the problem: the usefulness of the new kinds of traffic analysis that the
technologies of surveillance and target communication make possible is enormous.
It should not be difficult to convince legislators and judges that there is a compelling
need to engage in these newly productive types of surveillance, especially when the
surveillance can be justified as necessary for the “War on Terrorism.” But the risks
to personal liberty, and to the personal autonomy that lies at the core of liberty,
while unprecedented, are likely to be overlooked when framed within legal concepts
developed under the impact of past technologies to distinguish areas in which people
have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” from areas where they do not.
Furthermore, legislative and judicial decisions about striking the right balance
between surveillance and privacy tend almost always to assume that the government
will maintain the confidentiality of everything that it collects. In fact, experience
shows that individual government officials and agents do not necessarily respect
confidentiality obligations.433 The investigation of the Vice President’s office with
respect to disclosing the identity of CIA agent Plame, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover’s use of wiretap conversations to undermine the credibility of Martin Luther
King, the role of FBI executive Mark Felt as Deep Throat in the Watergate controversy, FBI leaks about an individual suspected for a time of being the Atlanta
432
433

See 18 U.S.C. § 3121–3127 (2006).
See generally STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION 75–94 (1984).
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Olympics bomber, and many other instances demonstrate that when even the most
secretive government agencies have explosive information about individuals, the
temptation to leak it is strong.
Consider further what would be in the information pool subject to possible leaks
if widespread traffic analysis is performed, either monitoring e-mail communications and cell phone communications or monitoring web browsing. The patternmatching tools are imprecise, and it is inevitable that someone engaging in perfectly
innocuous activities would occasionally come under suspicion. Heightened suspicion means that more data would be collected and more attention paid to it. And
minimization does not work very well in these new contexts. So communications
and web browsing associated with suspect persons or subjects would be accompanied by data on other matters of a sensitive nature to the target, albeit unrelated to
national security threats or to criminal activity, obviously including sexual relationships or interests that the target legitimately would not want exposed to others. The
temptation to leak these kinds of traffic would be especially strong to a leaker who
wants to injure the target, because the leaks would not jeopardize legitimate national
security or criminal intelligence.
3. Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism
The growing awareness, not only by governments, but also by the general
public, of the magnitude of the threat posed by cyberterrorism will make it easier to
impose technological controls that undermine the essential features of the Internet
architecture and that subject everyone to more intrusive government surveillance.
The cyberterrorism threat not only involves Internet use to organize physical
terrorist acts, as al-Qaeda has done; it also provides a platform for effectuating
attacks.434 If an attacker could disable access to bank records or corrupt the data,
interfere with military command and control systems, disable the intelligence that
manages the electricity grid, or bring down the air traffic control system, the level
of resulting chaos could exceed that resulting from a nuclear attack on a few cities
and defense installations. It is right to worry about this and to take steps to mitigate
the threat.
But, too often, the terrorism experts do little beyond wringing their hands about
the limited power of governments to control the Internet. Implicitly, they yearn for
a return to the technological environment of the mid-1950s, when a cozy relationship between intelligence agencies and one telephone company, one domestic
telegraph company, and a handful of international cable carriers was all govern-
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See Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against
Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 57, 74 (2010).
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ments needed to keep an eye on things and, occasionally, to disrupt communications
tying potential attackers together.
It is likely that focused public relations campaigns can shift public opinion to
favor more controls on the Internet and a relaxation of the legal barriers to eavesdropping. Not only that, but some of the boundaries that have historically restricted
some types of eavesdropping more than others—access to the content of communications, as opposed to communications transaction date—are becoming less relevant. The enormous amount of transactional data now available that reveals location,
communications patterns, and web browsing histories present a new opportunity for
traffic pattern analysis that rivals access to content in what it reveals about individual activities and intentions.435
III. APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED: ROLE OF LAW, INNOVATION, MARKETS,
DISPUTES
The Internet’s success has validated the central features of its constitution,
embodying important ideologies that define Western society: the efficiency of
market-based competition in allocating resources, and the power of grassroots
democracy. Human rights have benefitted.436 Human rights abuses are more likely
to come to the attention of those who can do something about the violations.
Grassroots democratic movements are more possible. The individual freedom that
comes with being able to start one’s own business, perform music for the masses,
or tell stories through books or movies enjoys a new life.
Markets and democracy have been newly empowered by the Internet’s decentralized architecture and its global scope. The smallest entrepreneur can specialize
in what he knows best and rely on others to perform other necessary functions,
linking all the inputs together through standardized interfaces and protocols. The
weakest voice has an enormous megaphone represented by the World Wide Web.
Competition and democratic discourse, however, have always threatened
established orders and elites. When new technologies increase, both motive and
means exist to block or divert the new technologies. This may occur through
changes in the content of the law or its enforcement mechanisms, as manifested by
the efforts of large copyright owners to broaden liability for infringement, some
successful, some not yet successful. It also may occur by economic or social pressure brought to bear on institutions controlling key bottlenecks, as in the case of
rights-holders pressuring ISPs to throttle traffic that they perceive as facilitating
infringement.
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The best public policy is one that recognizes the harmful potential of new
regulation of the Internet, made more likely by the asymmetry of political power
favoring established institutions. At the same time, legal initiatives may be appropriate to restrict the exercise of private power that can be as harmful as undue regulation. Telling the difference is hard; advocates for blocking competition always can
dress up their campaigns as effort to block the exercise of private power they
characterize as harmful to the public interest.
A growing source of private power is that of proprietary empires.437 Big intermediaries are drawn into regulatory roles because they represent bottlenecks where it
is relatively easy to regulate the conduct of people at the edge of the Internet.
Whether and how these private regulators are subject to the constraints of due
process is an important question of Internet policy.438
Governmental regulation may be more transparent and have more features of
due process than private regulation, especially when private regulation is implemented through technological measures that automatically determine a “violation”
of “rules” and automatically impose penalties such as excluding a user from Internet
resources.439
Developing new legal responses should follow the course that law usually has
taken in the Anglo-American tradition: law makers should not try to anticipate what
will happen in the marketplace. Rather, they should wait and see which entrepreneurs succeed and which fail; they should wait for consumers to decide what is the
next new thing. Then, they should wait a while longer to allow actual disputes to
emerge, disputes significant enough for the disputants to sue each other. Then they
should allow the courts to resolve the disputes by adapting well-established legal
principles. Only when the pattern of judicial decision-making seems to have gone
awry should legislators intervene. This has been the course generally followed in
connection with the Internet, and it has been successful.
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